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THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
REGIMES: A CHINESE-INSPIRED
RECONSTRUCTION
Roda Mushkat

Abstract
The challenge of protecting the biosphere has both salient academic
and policy dimensions. On the academic side, persistent efforts have been
made in the field of socio-legal studies to enhance the understanding of the
complex processes involved, in the domestic arena and on the international
front, in the formation and transformation of the elaborate institutional
arrangements designed to contribute to this goal. The scholars engaged in
those efforts have pursued divergent paths, but one school of thought has
moved decisively to the forefront. China’s experience does not cast doubt
on its relevance, or even prominence, yet it suggests that multi-pronged
research strategies may prove more effective.
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I. Introduction
The notion of governance has long loomed large on the legal and
social science research agendas. In 1975, it metamorphosed into a broader
analytical construct, when the idea of a regime was floated.1 The latter was
defined by a researcher in the field of international relations as a "set of
mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies,
and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a [relevant]
group of [participants in the political process]."2 The concept of a
governance regime has subsequently gained currency.3 For the past three
decades or so, it has generally been viewed as a useful vehicle for
conveying the existence of elaborate institutional mechanisms whose
purpose is to consistently influence the actions of players in the political
arena, both domestic and international.4
The initial definition merely served as a starting point in a quest to
render it meaningful and workable. As theory-building efforts and
empirical testing expanded in scope and assumed a more diverse form, it
became apparent that a slightly wider and a somewhat less elastic formula
would be needed. A definition better meeting the growing requirements of
the large number of scholars from divergent disciplinary backgrounds who
opted to focus on the subject emerged at an academic conference devoted to
systematically exploring the fundamental attributes of governance regimes.5
A consensus crystallized that they constitute:
[S]ets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given [political domain].
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.
Norms are standards of behavior. Rules are specific
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making
procedures are prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choice.6
1. See John G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and
Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 570–73 (1975) (discussing the concept, purposes, and functions
of international regimes).
2. Id. at 570.
3. See infra note 21 (exemplifying the growing literature on governance regimes).
4. See infra note 21 (providing examples of both domestic and international
governance regimes).
5. See Krasner, infra note 6, at 2–5 (exploring the different perspectives of
contributory authors regarding definition of regime and regime change). See also Young &
Osherenko, infra note 60, at 1 (providing discussion about the relevant academic
conference).
6. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
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The new formulation consists of four key components: "principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures."7 The differences are subtle
and may be easier to grapple with at the theoretical level than in practical
settings. The overall hierarchical structure however seems to be viable,
involving an orderly stepwise progression from the general/strategic to the
specific/operational elements. While a certain degree of ambiguity and
incompleteness persists, this definition continues to feature prominently in
the literature on governance regimes and firmly underpins much of the
varied research pursued in this area.8
Such research displays a pronounced normative orientation. The
principal goal is to identify regime characteristics that may improve wellbeing in the domestic and international arenas, transform them into
effective institutional instruments and ensure that the prescriptive edifice is
adhered to. Some of the studies undertaken in this field however are
primarily geared toward enhancing the understanding of regime anatomy
(description) and physiology (explanation).9 A recent empirical project that
falls into this category is an examination of the relationship between
governance regimes, corruption, and economic growth.10
The definition of a governance regime adopted by economists/political
scientists has been applied across the policy spectrum, including in the
environmental domain.11 Given the practical orientation displayed by
scholars concerned with ecological issues, they have however tended to
decompose this formula, bring into focus its individual components, and

7. Id. See also Young & Osherenko, infra note 63, at 1 (discussing the key
components of governance regimes).
8. See William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global
Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 501, 514 (2001) (recognizing the
most common definition of regime as "[p]rinciples, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area"). See generally
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 454 (1995) (reviewing REGIME
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger et al. eds.,1993)) (examining
literature on regime theory and international relations).
9. See infra Part II (discussing regime anatomy and physiology).
10. See Toke Aidt, Jayasri Dutta, & Vania Sena, Governance Regimes, Corruption,
and Growth: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 195, 195 (2008) (assessing "the role
of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth.").
11. See Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of International
Environmental Regimes, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1, 1 (Oran R. Young ed.,
1999) (" [R]egimes are ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules,
procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific . . . areas.’"
(quoting Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young & Michael Zürn, The Study of International
Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 267, 274 (1995))).
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draw a distinction between prevailing orders and regimes in the strict sense
of the term.12
The former are regarded as "broad, framework arrangements
governing the activities of all (or almost all) the members of [domestic or]
international society over a wide range of specific issues."13 By contrast,
the latter are viewed as "more specialized arrangements that pertain to welldefined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only
some subset of the members of [domestic or] international society."14
Again, in light of their practical disposition, environmental researchers have
predominantly explored institutional configurations akin to regimes rather
than widely-based/higher-level orders.15
The notion of an environmental governance regime, as outlined here,
has been subject to extensive theoretical and empirical exploration.16
Substantial descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive insights have been
generated by researchers studying the subject.17 Chinese attitudes and
behavior however have been accorded scant attention, despite the size of
the country, its growing economic and political prominence, the massive
ecological degradation it has witnessed, and the inadequate measures it has
embraced to cope with the problem.18 The purpose of this paper is to
selectively shrink the gap by using certain China-specific experiences as a
platform for offering some analytical observations about the development
of environmental governance regimes.

12. See ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR
NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 (1989) [hereinafter YOUNG,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION] ("[S]tudents of international affairs . . . divide the category
of international institutions into two more or less distinct subsets: international orders and
international regimes.").
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 13 ("[S]tudents of
international affairs . . . divide the category of international institutions into two more or less
distinct subsets: international orders and international regimes."); Young & Levy, supra
note 11, at 1 (quoting Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young & Michael Zürn, The Study of
International Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 267, 274 (1995)) ("[R]egimes are ‘social
institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs that
govern the interactions of actors in specific . . . areas.’") [Again, see my
comment/explanation at Note 11.]
16. Infra Part II.
17. Infra Part II.
18. Infra Part III.
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II. Conceptual Foundations
A. Competing Paradigms
The prolonged search for a satisfactory definition may be attributed to
intellectual birth pangs rather than merely a combination of the inherent
complexity of the underlying phenomenon and methodological
thoroughness.19 The initial phases of the evolution of the academic work
devoted to regimes, including those ecologically-centered, were
characterized by a degree of doubt, tension, and uncertainty. These features
persist, but on a much more modest scale, and the studies currently
undertaken are marked by a considerable measure of continuity,
connectivity, and overall direction. They may be considered as part of a
coherent, integrated, and ongoing scholarly enterprise.20
In the environmental domain, this enterprise is systematically geared
toward shedding light on regime attributes, regime types/variations, regime
formation, regime change, and regime effectiveness/consequences.21 The
attention accorded to each individual dimension has shifted over time.22 As
theoretical knowledge has accumulated and a meaningful body of empirical
19. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 12.
20. See infra note 21 (providing examples of current scholarly research related to
governance regimes).
21. See generally GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE
ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE (Oran R. Young ed., 1997) (further assessing international
regime governance); INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS,
APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS (Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King & Heike
Schroeder eds., 2008) (evaluating the relationship between institutions and regimes);
REGIME CONSEQUENCES: METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES (Arild
Underdal & Oran R. Young eds., 2004) (assessing regime effectiveness); ORAN R. YOUNG,
CREATING REGIMES:
ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (1988)
[hereinafter YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES] (providing examples of international regime
creation); ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE:
FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE (2002) (discussing the role of institutions with regard to
environmental change); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12 (providing an
overarching analysis of regime building); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE:
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994) [hereinafter YOUNG,
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE] (analyzing international regime governance); ORAN R.
YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES: NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1982)
[hereinafter YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES] (assessing resource regimes in an environmental
context); POLAR POLITICS: CREATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES (Oran R.
Young & Gail Osherenko eds., 1993) (providing an overview of international regime
creation); JORGEN WETTESTAD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: THE KEY
CONDITIONS (1999) (discussing the elements essential to environmental regime creation);
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS (Edward L. Miles et al. eds., 2002) (considering
the elements necessary for effective environmental regimes); Young & Levy, supra note 11
(discussing the effectiveness of international regimes in an environmental context).
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (providing a breadth of literature on
regime formation, identification, and effectiveness).
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findings has emerged, researchers have naturally started placing less
emphasis on description (attributes and types/variations) than explanation
(formation and change) and evaluation (effectiveness/consequences).23 The
rapid deterioration in ecological conditions, coupled with the perception
that policy responses are inadequate, has lately turned the issue of
effectiveness/consequences into the principal intellectual concern.24
Because of its intricate nature, this is a more resource-intensive issue
than the others, which has compounded the crowding-out problem.25 That
said, the interest in regimes attributes, types/variations, formation and
change has merely diminished rather than disappeared altogether.26 These
facets of environmental regime structure and dynamics, particularly the last
two, continue to loom on the scholarly agenda.27 There is no reason to
assume that this pattern is likely to reverse itself as many relevant questions
pertaining to description and explanation remain unanswered.28 The focus
in the present paper on regime development (formation and change, but
primarily the former) is thus by no means misplaced.
It should be noted at the outset that some regimes, in the ecological
domain and elsewhere, are self-generating or spontaneous entities.29 Like
in the unfettered marketplace, the expectations of the players involved
converge, despite the absence of a conscious effort to this effect or
occasionally even consciousness, and shape their behavior without recourse
to formal coordination.30 This is an elusive phenomenon whose essence
cannot be readily captured.31 A relatively successful attempt by a
prominent libertarian economist has produced the following succinct
observation: "[some regimes are] the products of the action of many men
but…not the result of human design."32
The processes giving rise to spontaneous governance systems have not
been satisfactorily accounted for.33 Socio-biological explanations are
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same).
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same).
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same).
26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same).
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same).
28. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same).
29. See, e.g., 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER
37 (1973) (discussing the distinction and differences between exogenous and endogenous
orders).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 38 ("[S]uch orders . . . do not obtrude themselves on our senses but have
to be traced to our intellect. We cannot see, or otherwise intuitively perceive, this order of
meaningful actions, but are only able mentally to reconstruct it by tracing the relations that
exist between the elements.").
32. Id. at 37. See also ARILD VATN, INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 169–191
(2005) (discussing institutional establishment and change).
33. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 85 ("The processes
through which spontaneous arrangements arise are not well-understood.").

ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE REGIMES
regarded as excessively mechanical and those derived from social
psychology as overly static.34 Game theorists have explored methodical
coordination between interdependent actors in situations where explicit
communication is not possible or does not take place.35 The ideas
generated by them are not without theoretical appeal, although in
themselves they fall significantly short of furnishing a comprehensive
analytical framework, due to the parsimonious nature of the models
employed and the narrow lens through which social interaction is
dissected.36
Negotiated governance regimes are easier to trace chronologically and
outline conceptually.
Such comparatively transparent institutional
arrangements are "characterized by conscious efforts to agree on their
major provisions, explicit consent on the part of the individual participants,
and formal expression of the results."37 A number of distinctions are
commonly drawn in this context (e.g., between "constitutional contracts"
and "legislative bargains," and "comprehensive … and partial or piecemeal"
regimes38).39 They are broadly relevant, but not essential for accounting for
every conceivable aspect of regime development, and will thus not be
pursued any further here.
Imposed regimes, such as those forced on China in the wake of the
Opium Wars,40 stand in sharp contrast to self-generating or spontaneous
ones in that they are deliberately conceived and asymmetrically
structured.41 The source of the initiative is typically a dominant power or a
34. See id. at 85–86 ("The propositions of sociobiology are not sufficient to provide a
satisfactory account of the formation of institutional arrangements that take such diverse
forms and change so rapidly. And social psychology offers no comprehensive theoretical
account of interactive learning relevant to the emergence of social conventions.").
35. See generally ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENTBASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION (1997) (discussing various models of
cooperation) ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (analyzing the
theory of cooperation, with particular reference to the Prisoner’s Dilemma); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980) (providing a comprehensive analysis of
conflict theories and strategies).
36. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 85–86 (discussing
regime development).
37. Id. at 86.
38. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 86–87 ("Such
regimes may take the form either of constitutional contracts or legislative bargains . . . . It is
useful, as well, to distinguish between comprehensive negotiated regimes and those that can
be described as partial or piecemeal.").
39. Id.
40. See Alfred W. McCoy, From Free Trade to Prohibition: A Critical History of the
Modern Opium Trade, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 310 (discussing the two different
Western governance regimes forced on China in the wake of the narcotics trade).
41. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 88 ("Imposed
arrangements differ from self-generating or spontaneous regimes in that they are fostered
deliberately by dominant powers or consortia of dominant powers.").
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group of players with superior resource capabilities.42 The means employed
may consist of some combination of coercion, cooptation, and material
manipulation.43 Since no consent of subordinate parties is sought and
effective operation does not hinge on formal expression, this type of regime
also differs fundamentally in both theory and practice from negotiated
arrangements.44 Again, that is a subject that will not be examined in any
detail in the present paper.
The choice not to delve into the workings of spontaneous and imposed
regimes is not a reflection of their rare occurrence. Quite the contrary, it
should be acknowledged that the incidence/prevalence of such
arrangements is far greater than suggested in the literature on the subject,
which is heavily influenced by schools of thought that possibly overstate
the role played by conscious design in institutional development and are illdisposed toward organic conceptions of society (as a spontaneously
organized system) because of their apparent illiberal underpinnings.45 Both
spontaneous and imposed regimes are common phenomena, particularly in
international settings, but they are just not highly relevant as distinct entities
in this specific context.
Environmental researchers portray regime development as a multiphase iterative cycle.46 Those who focus on the domestic arena typically
identify for purposes of analysis six separate stages, each with its own
unique characteristics, through which the players involved move in a
loosely sequential fashion: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy
adoption, policy implementation, policy evaluation, and policy
adjustment.47 The last step in the process (i.e. adjustment) may entail
merely changes in the status quo or may feature more decisive action such
as outright termination.48

42. Id.
43. See id. at 88 ("In short, imposed regimes are established deliberately by dominant
powers who succeed in getting others to conform to the requirements of these arrangements
through some combination of coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives.").
44. See id. ("[S]uch regimes typically do not involve explicit consent on the part of
subordinate actors, and they often operate effectively in the absence of any formal
expression").
45. Id. at 90–92.
46. See generally MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH, & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING
PUBLIC POLICY: POLICY CYCLES AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS (3rd ed. 2009) (elaborating on the
six stages of the public policy cycle); MICHAEL E. KRAFT & SCOTT R. FURLONG, PUBLIC
POLICY: POLITICS, ANALYSIS, AND ALTERNATIVES (2nd ed. 2006) (providing a broad
overview of the field of public policy).
47. See HOWLETT, supra note 46, at 91–211 (discussing the six public policy stages);
KRAFT & FURLONG, supra note 46, at 71–84 (analyzing the six stages of public policy).
48. See HOWLETT, supra note 46, at 197–211 (providing an overview of patterns of
policy change); KRAFT & FURLONG, supra note 46, at 71–72, 84 (analyzing the six stages of
public policy).
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The international arena is more decentralized than its domestic
counterpart49 and this necessitates a somewhat different approach. Fewer
phases are commonly singled out and less emphasis is normally placed on
semi-structured iteration within a clearly-defined cyclical framework.50
The number of stages identified seldom exceeds three (e.g., pre-negotiation,
negotiation, and post-negotiation; or, alternatively, agenda setting,
negotiation, and operationalization)51 and the overall process has a linear
quality to it, although it may be protracted in nature and may involve
lengthy pauses, extended sideways drifting, and sharp retreats.52 The core
phase "begins with the initiation of direct and focused negotiations and ends
with the signing of an agreement."53 Additional interrelated activities
precede and follow it:
The pre[-]negotiation stage encompasses the process
through which an issue initially finds its way onto the
international agenda, gets defined or framed as a topic for
international consideration, and reaches a sufficiently
prominent place on the agenda to justify expending the
time and effort involved in explicit negotiations. The post[]negotiation stage covers all those steps needed to
transform an international agreement signed by the parties
who have agreed on its terms into an actual institutional
arrangement in place. Among other things, this entails
ratification by the signatories and implementation within
the domestic jurisdiction of the individual members.54

49. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 12–13 (analyzing
international regime governance).
50. See generally YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 23, at 4–27 (providing
examples of international regime creation); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra
note 23, at 82–84 (analyzing international regime governance); Ho-Won Jeong, Dynamics of
Environmental Negotiations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCEDURES 101, 102–105 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 2001) (discussing environmental regimes in
the context of negotiation).
51. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 83 ("[I]t is helpful to
divide the overall sequence into at least three stages: pre[-]negotiation, negotiation, and
post[-]negotiation.").
52. See YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 23, at 4–27 (providing examples of
international regime creation); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 82–
84 (analyzing international regime governance).
53. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 83.
54. Id.
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Table 1: Key Features of Principal Phases of Regime Development
1. Driving forces: Ideas are particularly prominent during
agenda setting; interests dominate the stage of negotiation;
material conditions become increasingly significant in the
course of the shift from paper to practice.
2. Players: There are no discernible changes from one stage
of regime development to another in the roles played by
organizations. However, in the case of individuals,
intellectual leadership is crucial during agenda setting,
entrepreneurial leadership looms large in the course of
negotiation, and structural leadership is vital throughout the
entire process.
3. Collective-action problems: Gridlock is the classic
collective-action problem of the negotiation stage;
miscommunication is the standard pitfall of agenda setting;
asymmetries in levels of effort are the typical hazard of
operationalization.
4. Context: Broad shifts in the political environment affect
agenda setting; more specific exogenous events impinge on
negotiations; domestic constraints influence
operationalization.
5. Tactics: The concern with threats and promises is most
pronounced during negotiation; efforts to shape the framing
of the problem manifest themselves in the course of agenda
setting; administrative/bureaucratic maneuvers gain
momentum during operationalization.
6. Design perspectives: Agenda setting is the time for
considering the big picture; negotiation gives rise to a
preoccupation with the language to be included in the
agreements; operationalization heightens sensitivity to the
domestic repercussions of policy action and dampens
enthusiasm for international cooperation.
Adapted from Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance,
supra note 7, at 21.

The academic literature on the development of domestic governance
regimes is characterized by a greater degree of coherence than that on their
international counterparts.55 This may be attributed to structural differences
55. See generally DANIEL J. FIORINO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1995)
(assessing policy formation); SALWA S. GOMAA, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING IN EGYPT
(1997) (providing an analysis of policy making with particular reference to policy making in
Egypt); MICHAEL R. GREENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE (2008)
(providing a general overview of policy making in an environmental context); JOHN B.
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stemming from divergent authority patterns.56 As indicated, political power
is centralized (albeit not uniformly) within States but not beyond their
confines (again, there are variations in this respect).57 Given the broad
regularities observed, environmental researchers have thus been content to
undertake domestically-centered studies without stretching the established
analytical boundaries,58 while pushing the conceptual envelope on the
international front.59 For the same reasons, this paper has a similar bias,
although an attempt is made to draw on China’s experience at home as well.
Scholars who explore the development of negotiated international
environmental regimes embrace a number of competing theoretical
perspectives.60 Those who derive their inspiration from microeconomics
favor utilitarian explanations of the behavioral patterns observed in the
global arena.61 The fundamental assumption is that these patterns are the
LOOMIS & GLORIA E. HELFAND, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS FOR DECISION MAKING
(2001) (considering how policy and decision making intertwine); MIRANDA A. SCHREURS,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES (2002) (comparing
Japanese, German, and American approaches to environmental policy making); ALBERT
WEALE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: AN EVEN CLOSER ECOLOGICAL
UNION (2000) (discussing regime governance in Europe); RUDIGER K.W. WURZEL,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING IN BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE
EUROPEANIZATION OF AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (2002) (providing examples of
British and German policy making in the European Union).
56. See supra note 55 (providing general background information of comparative
policy making).
57. See supra note 55 (same).
58. See supra note 55 (same).
59. See generally POLAR POLITICS: CREATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIMES, supra note 23(providing an overview of international regime creation); YOUNG,
CREATING REGIMES, supra note 23 (providing examples of international regime creation);
YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23 (analyzing international regime
governance).
60. See generally GABRIELLA KUTTING, ENVIRONMENT, SOCIETY, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 14–
15 (2000) (analyzing social organizations in an environmental context); KATE O’NEILL, THE
ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 7–20 (2009) (discussing global
environmental issues and how they may be addressed); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 91–95 (analyzing international regime governance); HoWon Jeong, Politics for Global Environmental Governance, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 52, at 3, 15–20 (providing insight on
political issues with regards to international environmental governance regimes); Matthew
Paterson, Theoretical Perspectives on International Environmental Politics, in PALGRAVE
ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 54, 55–59 (Michele M. Betsill,
Kathryn Hochstetler, & Dimitris Stevis eds., 2006) (providing a general overview of
international political theory); Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko, The Formation of
International Regimes:
Hypotheses and Cases, in POLAR POLITICS:
CREATING
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES, supra note 23, at 1, 11–13 (providing
international regime case studies).
61. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 91–95 (discussing
the utilitarian model of regime formation).
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product of actions taken by players motivated by a desire to maximize
benefits and minimize costs (including transaction costs).62 The logic
extends to inter-party cooperation, which has material consequences, some
positive and some negative.63 When the joint gains potentially exceed the
losses by a comfortable margin, cooperation may lead to regime
formation.64
Another school of thought, the realist variant, is grounded in
traditional-style political science, which is primarily concerned with the
exercise of power, or who gets what, when and how.65 Its worldview rests
on an unambiguously pessimistic perception of human nature that is
underpinned by Machiavellian/Hobbesian philosophy.66 States are believed
to be principally driven by considerations of national interest/power.67 The
relentless quest for power lies at the root of international conflict/war.68
The emergence of powerful States/hegemons however may exert a
stabilizing influence/bring about hegemonic stability, paving the way for
regime formation (reflecting power asymmetries but not necessarily
amounting to a forceful imposition by one party over another).69
Neorealist accounts diverge in some respects from this analytic
configuration.70 The international system is thought to be far more
decentralized and feature much less inequality among States.71 It is also
regarded as considerably more fluid and significantly less resistant to

62. See id. (discussing the utilitarian model of regime formation).
63. See id. (same).
64. See id. (same).
65. See generally KUTTING, supra note 63, at 12–13 (providing an overview of
realism); HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW (1990)
(providing a critical understanding of political actors’ methods and results); O’NEILL, supra
note 63, at 7–29 (discussing various schools of thought related to international
environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 87–91
(assessing realism); Young & Osherenko, The Formation of International Regimes:
Hypotheses and Cases, supra note 63, at 9–11 (discussing power-based hypotheses).
66. See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 12 ("It takes a pessimistic view of human nature
grounded in Machiavellian and Hobbesian philosophy.").
67. See id. ("Because of its emphasis on the political sphere, the realist perspective
reduces analysis of the relationship between states to issues of power and self-interest, i.e.
national interest.").
68. See id. ("The drive to maximize power leads to war as states compete for power.").
69. Id. at 12–14.
70. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 87–91 (discussing
neorealism); KUTTING, supra note 63, at 13 (providing an assessment of the neorealist
philosophy); O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various school of thought related
to international environmental politics).
71. See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 13 ("[I]nternational systems are decentralized and
anarchic.").
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change because of frequent shifts in State capabilities.72 The implications
for regime development however are relatively modest.73 Greater attention
is accorded, typically in game-theoretic terms, to the provision of public
goods in an inherently anarchic global setting, but inter-party
cooperation/regime formation still hinges on the presence of a hegemonic
power/State.74
Cognitivist/psychological-style formulations constitute a genuine
departure from the rationalist characterizations of behavior witnessed in the
international arena.75 Inter-party cooperation/regime formation is not
portrayed as the result of deliberate moves by unitary players methodically
weighing the benefits and costs of alternative institutional arrangements in a
synoptic fashion.76 Those involved in the process seldom possess a clearlydefined and a highly-stable preference function/structure.77 Rather than
calmly and consistently resorting to a sophisticated utility/power calculus,
they are subject to a plethora of complex influences (e.g., belief systems,
cultural mores, decision styles, and predispositions toward risk and
uncertainty)78 and centrifugal forces.79
This leads to an emphasis on the role of social learning, ultimately
culminating in a convergence of views among key participants, as a factor
facilitating regime development.80 In itself that may prove to be an overly
weak formulation, because social learning in a decentralized global setting
is fundamentally a spontaneous process lacking a strong engine to propel it
72. See id. ("[T]he structure of the international system is determined by the
capabilities of the states/units in the system. Capabilities can change and therefore the
composition or balance of the international system can change.").
73. See id. ("[E]ven neorealism only accounts for short-lived and purely interestoriented cooperation. Therefore it cannot explain the web of international environmental
cooperation that has developed in this century.").
74. Id. at 13–14.
75. See O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various schools of thought related
to international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note
23, at 95–98 (elaborating on cognitivist philosophy).
76. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 95 ("The
cognitivists . . . do not accept the characterization of the parties to regime formation as
unitary actors weighing the costs and benefits of alternative institutional options in a
synoptic manner.").
77. See id. ("The cognitivists . . . reject the idea that the participants in the process of
regime formation possess well-defined preference structures that are not subject to change
during the course of the process.").
78. See id. ("[T]he cognitivists . . . see forces at work in efforts to form international
regimes or governance systems that cannot be captured in the calculations of the power
theorists or the utilitarians. These forces include belief systems, decision cultures or styles,
and attitudes toward risk and uncertainty.").
79. Id.
80. See id. at 95–96 ("One prominent theme is the role of a form of social learning that
can give rise to consensual knowledge . . . . On this account, a convergence of views among
the principal participants is a prerequisite for success in the process of regime formation.").
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forward.81 For this reason, the notion of epistemic communities is invoked
by those who subscribe to the cognitivist paradigm. 82 Such communities
consist of coalitions of professional experts and policy makers, normally
transnational in scope, who share a common understanding of the
underlying problem and the remedies called for.83 They go to great lengths
to convert their knowledge and convictions into appropriate institutional
arrangements/governance regimes.84
The application of these three theoretical perspectives in
environmental contexts has not been a resounding success.85 As noted
earlier, one difficulty associated with the utilitarian model lies in the
assumption that the preference orderings of participants in institutional
processes is comprehensively known and completely invariant.86 To
complicate matters, it is unrealistically posited that their identity may be
established at the outset and remains intact in the course of the negotiations;
the alternatives/ strategies available to them are fully specified; and the
outcome of each potential course of action is beyond doubt.87
Realist constructions may generate useful insights in policy domains
(e.g., economic and military affairs) where power is the dominant factor
shaping behavior.88 This is not thought to be the case in the environmental
sphere.89 Hegemonic impulses seem to have been relatively muted in that
area. Moreover, the apparently omnipotent States have often played a
81. See id. at 96 ("[T]his line of thought . . . seems to rely on a spontaneous process
that has no engine to drive it.").
82. See id. ("Concern with this problem has given rise to a growing literature on the
role that epistemic communities play in the process of regime formation.").
83. See id. ("On this account, epistemic communities are coalitions of scientists and
policymakers—usually transnational in scope—who share a common understanding of the
nature of the problem and appropriate solution and who make a concerted effort to inject
their point of view into the process of regime formation.").
84. See id. at 95–98 (elaborating on cognitivist philosophy); KUTTING, supra note 63,
at 20–21 (providing an assessment of epistemic communities); O’NEILL, supra, note 63, at
7–20 (discussing various schools of thought related to international environmental politics).
85. See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 14–15 (critiquing the neorealist approach);
O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various schools of thought related to
international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23,
at 91–95 (analyzing international regime governance); Young & Osherenko, supra note 63,
at 11–13 (discussing interest-based hypotheses).
86. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 93 (discussing
assumptions related to utilitarian modes of regime formation).
87. Id.
88. See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 12–13 (providing an overview of realism);
O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (assessing various schools of thought related to
international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23,
at 87–91 (discussing attributes of realism); Young & Osherenko, supra note 63, at 9–11
(elaborating on power-based hypotheses).
89. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 87–91(discussing
attributes of realism).
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limited role in regime development, allowing intergovernmental
organizations and/or international nongovernmental organizations to
exercise leadership or at least act as the principal catalyst for change.90
Despite their appeal as an antidote to reductionist utilitarian and realist
formulations, cognitivist models are not without shortcomings. 91 They may
have not served ecological researchers well by proving excessively
ambiguous, notoriously difficult to operationalize, and of little practical
value.92 Where operationalization has presented a surmountable problem,
the evidence has generally not supported the arguments put forth with
respect to environmental governance regimes.93 Cognitivists have also
treated the use of expert/policy knowledge as a strictly normative and
technical issue, stripping the process of its political dimensions.94
B. A Dominant Perspective?
Neoliberal institutionalism purports to overcome the limitations of the
three basic approaches outlined above. The liberal element reflects a
worldview that is more open to acknowledging the extent to which
cooperation prevails in the global arena, and embrace the logic
underpinning this phenomenon, than the conceptually more restrictive
(utilitarian, realist, and neorealist) perspectives.95 The fundamental thesis is
that States are highly interdependent and thus have a powerful incentive to
collaborate in order to obtain joint, or absolute, benefits for the international
community as a whole.96
In the absence of an overarching sovereign authority, the threat of
anarchy is a looming danger for global society and a potentially costly
prospect for its members.97 The high degree of decentralization makes it
90. Id.
91. See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 20–21 (providing an assessment of epistemic
communities); O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various schools of thought
related to international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE,
supra note 23, at 95–98 (assessing the cognitivist model); Young & Osherenko, supra note
63, at 19–20 (elaborating on knowledge-based hypotheses).
92. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 95–98 (assessing the
cognitivist model).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See O'NEILL, supra note 60, at 10–11 ("[Liberal theorists believe that] [i]n a world
where countries depend on one another for mutual peace and prosperity, there is a strong
incentive to work together to achieve joint, or absolute, gains for the international
community.").
96. See Paterson, supra note 60, at 55–59 ("[F]or liberal institutionalists,
interdependence . . . makes it rational in many instances to cooperate.").
97. See O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 10 ("For theorists in the neoliberal institutionalist
tradition, anarchy is a problem in that the absence of a sovereign authority makes it easy—
and desirable—for states to cheat on mutual agreements.").
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tempting and easy for States not to enter into collective accords and renege
on their commitments.98 Specifically, a single State may free-ride on
international agreements, capturing the benefits derived therefrom without
incurring any material obligations.99 Under this scenario, inter-party
cooperation is a remote possibility.100 Precisely for that reason, recognizing
their dependency upon each other in a complex yet fragile global setting,
States seek to collaborate with the aim of realizing mutual gains and
avoiding the consequences of parochial maneuvering.101
Institutional-building is the principal strategy employed to this end.
Elaborate organizational mechanisms are created to perform a variety of
stability-enhancing functions such as increasing transparency, reducing the
transaction costs of cooperation, monitoring compliance, undertaking
enforcement, and preventing cheating.102 The institutions that result from
this collective effort "are social practices consisting of easily recognized
roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations
among the occupants of these roles. The rules that link institutionalized
roles and . . . form the superstructure of institutions ordinarily encompass
sets of rights or entitlements . . . as well as sets of behavioral
prescriptions."103
International law, which is rooted in Grotian philosophy, embodies the
characteristics of an institutional approach, in the neoliberal sense of the
term, to the study of ecological degradation.104 It addresses descriptively,
analytically, and prescriptively the principles, norms, and rules that govern
relations between States.105 It blends static and dynamic perspectives, and

98. See Stephen D. Krasner, AEI Conference Trends in Global Governance: Do They
Threaten American Sovereignty?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 233 (2000) (discussing the power
dynamic between the United States and other countries).
99. See O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 10 ("Thus, a single state can free-ride on an
international agreement, and receive the benefits from it without paying any costs of
adjustment.").
100. See id. ("Under this scenario, no state cooperates, hoping instead to free-ride on
the actions of others.").
101. See id. ("Therefore, neoliberal institutionalists look for ways to mitigate these
problems.").
102. See id. ("They see international cooperation succeeding when states can work
together to realize joint gains, and when institutions are set up that can monitor compliance,
increase transparency, reduce the transactions costs of cooperation, and prevent most, if not
all, cheating.").
103. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 32.
104. See KUTTING, supra note 60, at 15 ("The legal approach has been included under
the neoliberal institutionalist rubric because of its shared origins in the Grotian philosophy of
international law.").
105. See id. ("International law is defined as a system of rules and principles that
govern the international relations between states. These rules are created by states for states
and cover almost any aspect of inter-state relationships." (citations omitted)) .
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focuses on actor behavior and processes.106 It seems to promote orderly
collaboration in the global arena through institutional channels, albeit in
accordance with a predominantly legal logic (i.e., by incorporating few
insights from other academic disciplines).107
A somewhat broader form of neoliberal institutionalism is the
modified realist/ structuralist variant, which eclectically draws on several
intellectual sources.108 The overall orientation is rationalist, but with less
attention to pure power politics, and greater emphasis on inter-party
cooperation.109 The approach is not rigidly State-centric (an attribute it
shares with cognitivism) in that the role played by other actors (e.g., civil
society) in regime development is duly recognized.110 While negotiated
governance systems, in the environmental domain and elsewhere, are
regarded as the product of bargaining/negotiation (although involving at
times a degree of coercive diplomacy), they are not dissected within a tight
game-theoretic framework.111
The modified realist/structuralist perspective has a number of salient
features. The number of players engaged in bargaining typically exceeds
two.112 It may amount to a merely handful of participants (such as the four
States that negotiated the fur seal regime) or constitute a larger group but
one relatively modest in size (such as the sixteen contracting parties to the
regime for Antarctic marine living resources or the twenty-seven
signatories to the 1987 protocol to the ozone depletion convention).113 In
certain circumstances, a very substantial number of participants (e.g., over
150, as in the efforts to forge a governance structure for deep seabed mining
in the context of the law of the sea negotiations) may contribute to the
process of the development of an institutionally-grounded environmental

106. See id. at 16 ("As compared to various [International Relations] approaches, the
international law perspective analy[z]es processes as well as actor behavio[]r.").
107. See id. at 15–17 (explaining the legal approach of neoliberal institutionalism).
108. See id. at 17 (suggesting that the concept of regime was first introduced in the
1970s by Ruggie, and later narrowed down by Krasner in the 1980s).
109. See id. at 18 ("The modified/structuralist view of regime theory . . . moves away
from the idea of pure power politics to more functional areas of international
cooperation . . . .").
110. See id. ("The basic approach of the modified realist view is state-centric although
it takes into account the existence of non-state actors . . . .").
111. See id. ("Regimes are seen as the result of bargaining and negotiations and these
results are often, but not necessarily, analy[z]ed in a game theoretical framework.").
112. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 99 ("Although there
may be disagreement . . . regarding the identity of the actors that participate in specific cases,
efforts to devise international regimes generally involve several autonomous parties.").
113. See id. ("There may be only a handful, such as the four states that negotiated the
fur seal regime, or a modest number, such as the sixteen parties to the regime for Antarctic
marine living resources or the twenty-seven parties to the 1987 protocol to the ozone
depletion convention.").
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management system.114 The corollary is that, "analytic constructs closely
tied to a two-party view of the world, like the Edgeworth box, cannot carry
us far in coming to terms with the politics of international regime
formation."115
By the same token, the multilateral bargaining that takes place in such
broadly-based and loosely-organized settings does not offer ample scope
for generating insights derived from rigorous game-theoretic treatments of
n-party situations which are geared toward identifying winning coalitions as
well as those most likely to come into existence.116 Unlike in other
institutional circumstances, where this type of problem structuring and
conceptual manipulation is potentially relevant and useful, attempts to
establish environmental governance regimes are normally aimed at arriving
at arrangements acceptable to as many parties involved in the negotiations
as possible.117 The pertinent criterion guiding behavior is a consensus rule
rather than one founded on majoritarian principles.118 Parties likely to
impede progress may be sidelined or excluded from the process
altogether.119
The likelihood of success in such a milieu is typically greater than
envisioned by game theorists operating within the confines of highly
stylized models. The reason lies in the fact that player interactions in the
environmental domain provide considerable scope for integrative (or
productive) bargaining as distinct from distributive (or positional) give-andtake.120 Since the parties involved in this type of mixed-motive maneuvers
do not embark on a search for a satisfactory outcome with a fixed and
invariant negotiation set (or contract curve), they are better motivated to
114. See id. ("In extreme cases, more than 150 states may be involved, as in the efforts
to work out a deep seabed mining regime in the context of the law of the sea negotiations.").
115. Id.
116. See id. ("[T]he multilateral interactions involved in regime formation do not lend
themselves well to analysis in terms of the usual game-theoretic treatments of n-party
situations which center on the identification of winning coalitions coupled with efforts to
single out those coalitions that are most likely to form.").
117. See id. ("Unlike the situation prevailing in most municipal legislatures, efforts to
form international regimes generally focus on the formulation of arrangements acceptable to
as many of those engaged in the negotiations as possible.").
118. See id. at 99–100 ("This is tantamount to saying that institutional bargaining in
international society operates on the basis of a consensus rule in contrast to a majoritarian
rule or some other decision rule justifying a focus on the development of winning
coalitions.").
119. See id. at 100. ("Those negotiating the terms of international regimes may seek to
exclude parties deemed likely to object to any reasonable institutional arrangements or
threaten to go forward with particular arrangements regardless of the opposition of one or
more parties.").
120. See id. ("The resultant negotiations are saved from certain failure because regime
formation in international society typically provides considerable scope for integrative (or
productive) bargaining in contrast to distributive (or positional) bargaining.").
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engage in exploratory exchanges designed to pinpoint opportunities for
striking mutually beneficial deals.121
The participants in this open-ended process may never unambiguously
identify the locus of the negotiation set (or the actual shape of the contract
curve) and they may consequently, and inelegantly by game-theoretic
standards, arrive at solutions that are Pareto-inferior in the sense that they
leave feasible joint games on the table.122 Be that as it may, those players
are less likely to become embroiled in lengthy and unfruitful negotiations
that produce recurrent and unbreakable gridlocks stemming from recourse
to strategic behavior and committal tactics whose purpose is to secure
advantages for one party or another.123
The development of environmental governance regimes is an uncertain
enterprise in that the participants confront an ill-defined and fluid picture
or, in technical parlance, a "veil of uncertainty"124 that renders it difficult
for them "to foresee how the operation of institutional arrangements will
affect their interests over time."125 Paradoxically, this is deemed to be a
positive feature of a highly challenging and seemingly intractable situation,
for the inability of individual parties to predict with any precision the
impact of a set of potential arrangements on their own welfare predisposes
them, in a Rawlsian fashion,126 toward seeking configurations that are
broadly equitable, increasing the probability of an outcome emerging that is
acceptable to all.127
121. See id. at 100–01 ("Negotiators who do not start with a common understanding of
the contours of the contract curve or the locus of the negotiation set . . . have strong
incentives to engage in exploratory interactions to identify opportunities for devising
mutually beneficial deals."); YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 21, at 11–15
(explaining the negotiation phase of international regime formation); Young & Osherenko,
supra note 21, at 13 ("[T]he thicker the veil of uncertainty, the easier it will be for parties to
approach the problem under consideration as an integrative exercise.").
122. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 101 ("Such
negotiators may never discover the actual shape of the contract curve or locus of the
negotiation set, and they may consequently end up with arrangements that are Pareto-inferior
in the sense that they leave feasible joint gains on the table.").
123. See id. ("At the same time, however, they are less likely to engage in negotiations
that bog down into protracted stalemates brought about by efforts to improve the outcome
for one party or another through initiatives involving strategic behavior and committal
tactics.").
124. See id. at 101–02 (explaining the "veil of uncertainty").
125. Young & Osherenko, supra note 21, at 13.
126. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971) (stating that
society should be built in a way that is fair for everyone).
127. See YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 21, at 11–15 ("The participants
seldom have a clear picture of the payoff possibility set when they embark on negotiations;
much of the negotiation process is exploratory in nature and involves efforts to expand the
range of possibilities available."); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at
101–02 (discussing the "veil of uncertainty"); Young & Osherenko, supra note 21, at 13
("Individual parties’ inability to predict a regime’s impact on their welfare increases
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The flexible and restrained mixed-motive bargaining conducted under
a veil of uncertainty, in scenarios bearing the hallmarks of neoliberal
institutionalism, has a number of additional noteworthy characteristics.
Elaborate inter-party negotiations coincide with extensive intra-party giveand-take.128 In recognition of the relevance of some ideas put forth by
cognitivists, the transnational environmental and scientific (i.e., epistemic)
communities are seen as playing a tangible, albeit one not readily amenable
to unequivocal specification, role in shaping developments on the
international ecological front.129
The inter-party and intra-party connection is merely one of a number
of significant cross-area/cross-event linkages that complicate the bargaining
process. Unlike in the more parsimonious utilitarian models, negotiations
revolving around environmental issues are not comfortably selfcontained.130 According to neoliberal institutionalists, they are often
undertaken in a wider context where there are close linkages to other items
on the domestic and/or international agendas.131 This may impede or
facilitate the development of an ecologically-centered governance regime,
depending on prevailing circumstances and capabilities of the players
involved.132
Given the pervasiveness of such intricate structural patterns, success
may elude the architects of a negotiated environmental governance regime,
possibly for a meaningful period of time. It is posited that a satisfactory
outcome is more likely to materialize when the following conditions
prevail: (1) the issues at stake lend themselves to treatment in a
contractarian mode133; (2) arrangements are available that all participants

incentives to formulate provisions that are fair or equitable, which raises the probability that
the parties can come up with institutional arrangements that are acceptable to all.").
128. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 104 ("Internal splits
between industrialists and environmentalists are common in connection with most pollutioncontrol arrangements.").
129. See id. at 103–05 ("[I]t would be a serious mistake to overlook the role of
transnational alliances among influential interest groups in developing and maintaining
governance systems at the international level.").
130. See id. at 105–06 ("Whereas the vision of negotiation incorporated in the
mainstream utilitarian models emphasize self-contained interactions, institutional bargaining
in the formation of international governance systems almost always features a rich array of
linkages to other events occurring in the socioeconomic or political environment.").
131. See id. (providing examples of various ways in which negotiations may link
domestic or international agendas).
132. See id. ("Sometimes these linkages pose more or less serious problems for those
seeking to establish institutional arrangements at the international level . . . . In some cases,
however, linkages work in favor of efforts to form international regimes.").
133. See id. at 107–09 ("Institutional bargaining can succeed only when the issues at
stake lend themselves to treatment in a contractarian mode." (emphasis omitted)).
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may accept as equitable134; (3) salient solutions (or focal points) describable
in simple terms may be identified135; (4) clear-cut and reliable compliance
mechanisms may be devised136; (5) exogenous shocks galvanize the players
involved into action137; and (6) relevant entrepreneurial leadership
manifests itself.138
In addition to endeavoring to shed light on the formation of environmental
governance regimes, neoliberal institutionalists have sought to explain their
change over time/transformation, or "significant alterations in a regime’s
structure of rights and rules, the character of its social-choice procedures,
and the nature of its compliance mechanisms."139 They have generally
divided the factors accounting for regime dynamics into endogenous and
exogenous.140
The former are inherent in specific institutional
arrangements.141
Attempts have been made in this context to construct models capturing
the essence of endogenous transformation.142 Some have been directed at
establishing the extent to which the key components of a regime may be
displaced before the whole structure unravels rather than shifts back toward
a point of equilibrium.143 This approach builds upon the reaction-process
models devised by social scientists exploring the evolution of arms races.144
An alternative form of rigorous conceptualization has reflected systems
thinking predicated on the assumption that the internal contradictions
leading to regime transformation may be effectively dissected by embracing
134. See id. at 109–10 ("The availability of arrangements that all participants can accept
as equitable is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed." (emphasis omitted)).
135. See id. at 110–11 ("The identification of salient solutions . . . describable in simple
terms increases the probability of success in institutional bargaining." (emphasis omitted)).
136. See id. at 111–12 ("The probability of success in institutional bargaining rises
when clear-cut and reliable compliance mechanisms are available." (emphasis omitted)).
137. See id. at 112–14 ("Exogenous shocks or crises increase the probability of success
in efforts to negotiate the terms of governance systems." (emphasis omitted)).
138. See id. at 114–15 ("Institutional bargaining cannot succeed in the absence of
effective entrepreneurial leadership on the part of individuals." (emphasis omitted)).
139. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 96.
140. See id. at 96–100 ("These processes sometimes revolve around factors that are
endogenous to specific institutional arrangements . . . . An alternative type of process
leading to regime transformation places greater emphasis on factors that are exogenous to
specific institutional arrangements.").
141. See id. at 96–97 ("Some regimes harbor internal contradictions that eventually lead
to serious failures and mounting pressures for major alterations.").
142. See id. at 97 ("Several approaches to the analysis of these internal contradictions
seem worth pursuing.").
143. See id. ("[By] treating any given regime as a system of action, we can ask how far
its central elements can be displaced before the system blows up rather than moves back
toward a point of equilibrium.").
144. See id. ("Perhaps the best known example of this approach at the international
level involves the reaction-process models devised by Richardson for the analysis of arms
races.").
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a holistic perspective (e.g., some type of dialectical reasoning geared
toward identifying system-wide tensions responsible for institutional
instability, as well as a host of related socio-physical phenomena).145
Other approaches to regime transformation focus on factors that are
exogenous to specific institutional arrangements. This may include shifts in
the structure of power,146 adjustments in the nature and distribution of
technology,147 substantial shifts in domestic priorities,148 and changes in
consumer/ producer demand.149
Environmental governance regimes do not function in a strategic
vacuum. The corollary is that meaningful adjustments in the structure and
modus operandi of one set of institutional arrangements may impinge on
those of another.150 The accentuation of this type of interdependence is a
salient feature of the neoliberal institutional paradigm. It remains to be
seen if and to what extent the experience of contemporary China may lend
selective support to the assumptions underlying this school of thought.

III. Chinese Lessons
A. Looking Inward
The first observation to be made in this context is that China’s
ecological history since the Communist Revolution suggests that the
concept of an environmental governance regime is less readily amenable to
analytical manipulation in circumstances where domestic issues are
grappled with than in situations involving international questions. It is not
easy to discern well-defined institutional patterns on the home front that
may have become entrenched for a period of time and trace with
145. See id. ("Alternatively, it may prove helpful to examine internal contradictions
leading to regime transformation in terms of the holistic perspective associated with
dialectical reasoning.").
146. See id. at 98 ("There can be no doubt . . . that . . . changes in the regime set forth in
the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention emerged directly from the expanding
influence of the United States over the marine fisheries of the region.").
147. See id. at 99 ("[T]he advent of large stern trawlers and factory ships after World
War II decisively undermined many unrestricted property regimes governing marine
fisheries, which had performed at least tolerably for a long time.").
148. See id. at 100 ("There can be no doubt . . . that growing attachments to policies
aimed at full employment and social welfare at the domestic level have played a significant
role in rendering fixed exchange rates unworkable in the international monetary regime.").
149. See id. ("Much the same is true of major increases in demand for certain renewable
resources arising from overall populating growth or sharp shifts in tastes among
consumers.").
150. See id. ("[A]ny success in efforts to modify the existing regime for whaling that
have the effect of encouraging the growth of stocks of great whales will have important
implications for arrangements governing the harvest of renewable resources such as krill, in
the Southern Ocean.").
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considerable precision the transformation of these patterns. Domestic
governance regimes appear to lack the compactness and transparency of
their international counterparts.
It would be tempting to conclude that attention should focus on attributes of
institutional constellations that reflect fundamental attitudes toward
society’s relationship with nature.151 It could thus be tentatively posited
that since 1949, Chinese environmental policies were initially pursued
within a strategic framework underpinned by the principle of coordinated
development (whereby ecological impulses need to be aligned with
economic ones),152 and that at some later juncture this has given way to
greater commitment to the goal of sustainable development.153
The implication would be that policy content (or overall policy thrust)
is the defining characteristic of a domestic environmental governance
regime.
The strength of the commitment to sustainable development is a moot point.
Strategic rhetoric notwithstanding, the present policy constellation is at best
akin in its focus to ecological modernization rather than a governance
regime with more lofty environmental aspirations. Those who shape it may
increasingly, albeit by no means vigorously, seek compatibility between
ecological preservation and economic growth, harnessing modern
technology in the process, without blatantly subjugating the former to the
latter.154 This is a more balanced approach to the relationship between

151. See ULRICH BRAND ET AL., CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE STATE: CONTESTED TERRAINS 9–52 (2008) (describing the
regulation of nature in post-Fordism).
152. See Michael Palmer, Environmental Regulation in the People’s Republic of China:
The Face of Domestic Law, 156 CHINA Q. 788, 791–92 (1998) ("The conceptual device for
the [Chinese] attitude to environmental protection was the principle of xietiao fazhan or ‘coordinated development,’ under which environmental protection is given the same importance
as the development of the national economy."). See also Ouyang Kang & Meng Xiaokang,
Environmental Protection: The Theory, Technological Policies and Practice in China, in
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 97, 100 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1994) ("Since the
founding of People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese government has acknowledged the
importance of environmental protection and has accordingly formulated a series of related
policies, laws and regulations, including the ‘comprehensive utilization of industrial rubbish’
directive of 1956.").
153. See ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 95–182 (2010) (describing China’s environmental problems
and the consequent measures that its leaders have since implemented) ; GEOFFREY MURRAY
& IAN G. COOK, GREEN CHINA: SEEKING ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES 178–224 (2002)
(describing China’s recent environmental policies) .
154. See Peter Ho, Trajectories for Greening in China: Theory and Practice, 37 DEV.
& CHANGE 3, 3–28 (2006) ("China is showing clear signs of greening as new institutions and
regulations are created, environmental awareness increases and green technologies are
implemented."); Arthur P.J. Mol, Equipment and Modernity in Transitional China:
Frontiers of Ecological Modernization, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 29, 29–56 (2006)
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society and nature than that witnessed during the 1949 to 1978
revolutionary era and the early phases of the post-1978 reform period, but it
does not amount to a solid commitment to sustainable development.
Environmental governance regimes may also be characterized in terms
of the regulatory instruments relied upon by those who oversee them. 155
The commonly available classifications may be employed for this purpose.
The mechanisms typically highlighted in that context, which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, encompass command-and-control systems,
self-regulation, enforced self-regulation, incentive-based strategies, marketharnessing controls, disclosure procedures, direct action, rights and
liabilities, and public insurance/compensation schemes.156
The regulatory architecture in China has been shifting in this respect.
The penchant for command-and-control mechanisms has diminished and
more flexible/indirect/versatile systems are being resorted to on a
meaningful scale.157 Again, however, the patterns emerging (or, for that
("[E]nvironmental reforms in contemporary China can be interpreted as ecological
modernization.").
155. See, e.g., IAN BAILEY, NEW ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACKAGING
WASTE DIRECTIVE 7–9 (2003) (introducing the effect of legislative instruments on
environmental policies for EU countries); ‘NEW’ INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE? NATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 81 (Andrew Jordan et al. eds., 2003)
(examining the support and criticism for use of policy instruments in regulatory reform);
NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 16–17 (Jonathan Golub ed.,
1998) (discussing generally the
pivotal role of instrument design in environmental
governance regimes);
156. See, e.g., ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION:
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 34–62 (1999) (analyzing different regulatory techniques
in the form of industrial, economic, and social activities, e.g., commanding, deploying
wealth, harnessing markets, control of information, acting directly, and conferring protected
rights.); ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND REGULATORY THEORY 121–261
(2004) (describing the different forms of social regulation and their application); BRONWEN
MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND REGULATION: TEXT AND
MATERIALS 79–150 (2007) (focusing the discussion on control mechanisms in the scheme of
regulatory reform).
157. See generally CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT]
(discussing the recent changes to China’s environmental regulatory scheme and how they
have affected "the relationship between development and the environment," focusing
specifically on the shift from trading environmental damage for the sake of its own
development); ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (Neil T. Carter & Arthur P. J. Mol
eds., 2007) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE] (evaluating the current steps under
way to deal with challenges in the area of Chinese environmental policy in light of the
accelerated economic development); XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE
(2000) (discussing the lack of improvement in environmental quality in the face of actually
improving regulatory structure and actual government commitment); Jolene Lin Shuwen,
Assessing the Dragon’s Choice: The Use of Market-Based Instruments in Chinese
Environmental Policy, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 617 (2004) (examining the change in
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matter, to have emerged) are not marked, at least at this juncture, by a high
degree of coherence.158 It should be acknowledged by those who dissect
these patterns that to paint them unambiguously would constitute a
challenging task, in all likelihood an impossible one. The corollary is that
the subject may be conceptualized tentatively but perhaps not methodically.
Another strategy for addressing this issue centers on the prevalent
form of environmental policy implementation. Indeed, it has long been
featured in the study of Chinese ecological management, albeit in an
intermittent and selective fashion.159 As soon as the dust began to settle on
the revolutionary era and reformist initiatives started to gain credibility,
three contrasting public program execution modes, embraced to one degree
or another during various periods by environmental planners in the country,
were proposed: the bureaucratic-authoritative, campaign-exhortation, and
market-exchange types.160 As the appreciation of the institutional nuances

China’s environmental protection scheme from command-and-control policies to the
"market-based instruments" proven successful in the United States).
158. See generally ECONOMY, supra note 1533 (discussing recent improvements in
China with regard to environmental protection: the drive for green technology, activism of
the country’s citizens, and the government’s to create eco-cities throughout the country);
MURRAY & COOK, supra note 1533 (analyzing, along with their historical, political,
economic, and cultural causes, current problems with China’s environment and the potential
effects that the switch to a market-oriented economy will have on them); Roda Mushkat,
Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights: A Relativist Perspective, 26 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 119 (2009) [hereinafter Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights]
(looking at the possibility of a worldwide environmental governing body and what its
existence means to global environmental governance); Roda Mushkat, Implementing
Environmental Law in Transitional Settings: The Chinese Experience, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 45 (2008) [hereinafter Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law]
(attempting to give more substance to the legal analysis on Chinese ecological governance
by providing background into the policy implementation that led that country to where it is
today).
159. See generally LESTER ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA 11–24 (1988)
(laying out the framework for three policy implementation types: bureaucratic-authoritative,
campaign-exhortation, and market-exchange) [hereinafter ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
CHINA]; Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 75–78
(summarizing Ross’s three policy implementation types); Christopher Tracy, Listening For
Sounds of Fallen Trees: The Principles on Forests and Lessons from Germany and China, 3
DET. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 469, 489–90 (1994) (citing to Ross’s book, but going further and
equating an administrative scheme with each policy implementation type: state with
bureaucratic-administrative; collectivization with campaign-exhortation; and private with
market-exchange).
160. See ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159, at 11–23
(identifying the three "policy implementation type[s]"); Lester Ross, The Implementation of
Environmental Policy in China: A Comparative Perspective, 15 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 489, 490–
91 (1984) [hereinafter Ross, The Implementation of Environmental Policy in China]
(introducing the "taxonomy of implementation types found in China").
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involved developed further, administrative decentralization was added to
this analytical set.161
Bureaucratic-authoritative implementation is characterized by a
substantial measure of centralization, is comprehensive in scope, is driven
by the ruling party, features obedience to authoritative commands, and is
underpinned by a structure of State/collectively-focused property rights.162
Execution of ecological strategies via campaign-exhortation is a
centralized, uneven, ruling party-orchestrated, normatively-inspired (but
coercion is also resorted to in order to secure compliance), and collectivelyoriented (verging on self-abnegation) affair.163 Implementation through
market channels follows a decentralized, comprehensive, and materiallyincentivized model which, by definition, relegates the ruling party to the
policy periphery and derives its vigor from the private ownership of
resources.164
Administrative decentralization should not be equated with genuine
marketization. On several occasions, including the early phases (pre-1994)
of the reform era, power has been transferred from the political center in
Beijing to the provinces (and other sub-national units) without any
meaningful economic restructuring.165 Even the empowerment of State-

161. See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC
REFORM 44–57 (2005) (giving background information for the period of "Administrative
Decentralization" that occurred from 1958 to 1978) [hereinafter JINGLIAN WU]; Mushkat,
Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at 153 (discussing, briefly
the fiscal decentralization that occurred during "the early stages of the post-1978
restructuring process"); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 76–
77 (concluding that the "tripartite typology" established earlier by Ross is missing a crucial
fourth implementation mode: administrative decentralization, a policy structure embraced
by Mao himself).
162. See ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159, at 11–15 (outlining
the first of the three policy implementation types—bureaucratic-authoritative
implementation).
163. See id. at 15–20 (describing the second of the three policy implementation types—
campaign-exhortation implementation).
164. See id. at 20–23 (outlining the final policy implementation type—market-exchange
implementation).
165. See generally ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159 (giving
general background information on Chinese environmental policy from the 1950s to the late
1980s, and suggesting ways that policy can be tailored in the future to better suit
environmental needs); JINGLIAN WU, supra note 161, at 43–89 (identifying the three periods
of Chinese ecological reform:
"Administrative Decentralization (1958 to 1978)";
"Incremental Reform (1979-1993)"; and "[the] Strategy of ‘Overall Advance’ (1994 to
present)"); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at 156–
65 (analyzing the effects of Chinese ecological reforms on the environment itself); Mushkat,
Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 77 (concluding that "[p]ower has
markedly shifted from the center to the periphery, even more so in practice than in theory" in
"the Chinese ecological governance architecture"); Ross, The Implementation of
Environmental Policy in China, supra note 160 (analyzing Chinese environmental policy
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owned enterprises (SOEs) does not amount to economic decentralization if
market channels are not restored and allowed to function autonomously. It
has been argued, albeit not conclusively, that market-exchange is the most
effective system for implementing ecological strategy in China and that
alternative models should be jettisoned.166
Policy execution patterns and regulatory instruments are not
independent of each other. The movement away from command-andcontrol techniques in the Chinese context has been associated with a shift
toward less bureaucratic/authoritarian forms of environmental policy
implementation.167 Yet a rigidly top-down approach was not the sole
strategy execution mechanism even during periods marked by intense
revolutionary fervor (when recourse to campaign-exhortation and
administrative decentralization was common).168 By the same token, the
implementation first in the three policy implementation types, then by its effects on changes
in strategy, and concluding that market-based implementation is the most favorable).
166. See ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159, at 184–87
(advocating for a market-exchange approach to deal with environmental policy issues in
China); JINGLIAN WU, supra note 161, at 415–16 (arguing that a market-enhancing view is
favorable over the market-friendly or developmental-state views); Mushkat, Implementing
Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 75–78 (discussing generally the application of the
three different models for policy implementation);
Ross, The Implementation of
Environmental Policy in China, supra note 160, at 508–12 (arguing that while bureaucratic
and campaign based implementation types are more politically acceptable, the marketexchange implementation model is more flexible, efficient, and innovative, and has a
substantially wider application in practice).
167. See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 135–75 (discussing the new political
environment in China’s environmental policy landscape and introducing three influential
activists and the specific changes that they have made); KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING
CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 279–88 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA] (discussing Chinese environmental reform after 1978 and
the current state of environmental policy); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153, at 210–24
(predicting a number of future possibilities for China’s environmental policy, ranging from
"Rosy" to "Doomsday"); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND
GROWTH 502–03 (2007) (discussing the increased incidence of civilian input in the
environmental policy decision-making process, signifying a shift away from an authoritarian
policy decision-making process); Mushkat, Contextualizing Human Rights, supra note 158,
at 66 (quoting a survey of policy shifts that show a change from "command and control
methods to one primarily relying . . . on market-harnessing techniques"); Mushkat,
Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 20–23 (arguing for economic and
governmental decentralization as a solution for policy implementation issues).
168. See LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 282–84 (discussing
China’s "move away from centralized planning" and its positive effects on environmental
policy). See generally ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 91–175 (discussing the economic
impact of Chinese environmental issues along with proposals for how China should proceed
in developing a sound, effective environmental policy regime); MURRAY & COOK, supra
note 153, at 178–224 (analyzing a variety of Chinese environmental policies and how they
were implemented); NAUGHTON, supra note 167 (giving a recent history of China’s
economy, focusing specifically on how it has affected the environment, and proposing
alternatives that will better both China’s economy and the environment); Mushkat,
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post-1978 configuration has been a hybrid and this is likely to remain the
case for the foreseeable future.169
A new analytical tool for capturing the essence of environmental
governance regimes is the concept of regulatory style. It has been applied
intensively in the European context where the tension between centripetal
and centrifugal forces has not abated despite the presence of substantial
unifying impulses.170 In this politico-geographic domain:
"[e]ach nation has a distinct regulatory style, which is a
function of its more general policy style, and which causes
the environment to be regulated very much in the same way
as other areas of corporate conduct. . . . It can sometimes
be more difficult to define a common EU policy given such
differences in regulatory traditions, than it is to reconcile
different opinions about the level of environmental
protection."171
The notion of regulatory style has been decomposed along two dimensions.
First, it has been assumed that a government’s approach to problem solving
may range from reactive (e.g., United Kingdom) to anticipatory (e.g.,
Contextualizing Human Rights, supra note 158 (discussing international proposals for
environmental law reform, with detail paid to China for a specific example of how Northern
and Western reformist schemes can be particularly beneficial); Mushkat, Implementing
Environmental Law, supra note 158 (concluding that failed execution has led to failures in
the Chinese environmental governance scheme, but suggesting that certain reforms have and
will continue to be successful in improving Chinese environmental regulation).
169. See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 95–133 (discussing the different ways that China
is changing its environmental policies in its various branches of government, ranging from
system-wide changes to specific mid-level changes in the legal system, Environmental
Protection Bureaus, and the judiciary); LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at
282–84 (summarizing the different post-1978 reforms and their positive and negative effects
on the environment); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153, at 178–224 (evaluating the more
recent state of environmental policy in China and looking at the different modern reforms
that have been made and their effects on the overall policy and environment as a whole);
NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 487–503 (discussing the intersection between the Chinese
economic changes over the last 30 years and air and water pollution levels); Mushkat,
Contextualizing Human Rights, supra note 158, at 160–65 (evaluating recent economic and
political changes in China’s economy and the corresponding increases in ecological
problems); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 63–74
(discussing the period after 1978 and the variety of changes that have been implemented in
China’s environmental legal regime).
170. See Mikael Skou Andersen & Duncan Liefferink, Introduction: The Impact of
Pioneers on EU Environmental Policy, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE
PIONEERS 1, 3–7 (Mikael Skou Andersen & Duncan Liefferink eds., 1997) (identifying
"‘[e]xamples’ and ‘models’" for environmental policy, including the United States, Japan,
and other EU countries).
171. Id. at 6.
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Germany).172 Second, it has been posited that a government’s relationship
with other core non-governmental players may vary between consensual
(e.g., United Kingdom) and impositional (e.g., Germany, other than in areas
where corporatist structures facilitate input from employers and unions).173
It has thus been poignantly noted that:
"British legislation must appear to our fellow Europeans to
be pragmatic, piecemeal, ad hoc, the product of
expedience, not principle: a policy to be described as a
non-policy. Yet British policy has deep roots in history. It
is the product of nearly two centuries of evolution in which
impracticable ideas have been eliminated, Utopian
aspirations have been discarded, and the policies which
have survived have been proved to work."174
While fundamentally appealing, the concept of regulatory style has posed
considerable practical challenges because of dynamic shifts and sectoral
differences (e.g., "[b]road generalizations about a national style of policymaking tend to obscure historical changes over time, variations between
fields of policy and the differences in the roles of various parties").175 This
has prompted some researchers to seek more specific patterns within welldefined areas of government activity (but ones that are not necessarily
stable, which is analytically less problematic than sectoral differences). In
the European context, the focus has thus moved from universal categories
toward concretely expressed environmental standard-setting approaches.176
172. See generally POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1982)
(discussing, in various articles, environmental policies in Western European countries,
including Germany, Norway, Great Britain, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands).
173. Id.
174. ERIC ASHBY & MARY ANDERSON, THE POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 152–53 (1981). See
also DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 269–76 (1986) (discussing historical British policy style,
which
is
characterized
by five
elements:
"sectorization,
clientelism,
consultation/negotiation, the institutionalization of compromise, and the development of
exchange relationships").
175. KLAUS VON BEYME, Policy-Making in the Federal Republic of Germany: A
Systematic Introduction, in POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1,
18 (Klaus von Beyme & Manfred G. Schmidt eds., Eileen Martin trans., 1985).
176. See generally TANJA A. BÖRZEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERS AND LAGGARDS IN
EUROPE: WHY THERE IS (NOT) A ‘SOUTHERN PROBLEM’ (2003) (comparing environmental
policy in Germany, seemingly the EU leader, with Spain, one of the problem countries with
respect to compliance with EU environmental laws); PETER J. MAY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACHES TO HAZARDS AND
SUSTAINABILITY (1996) (discussing policy changes in the United States, New Zealand, and
Australia and how they have affected the environment and governmental landscape
surrounding them, specifically as they relate to human interactions and governmental roles);
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The broadly based typology may not be entirely irrelevant for China in
that its ecological strategies may have not yet acquired the degree of
specificity observed elsewhere. The policy framework is evolving in a
more anticipatory and consensual (or, alternatively, less reactive and
impositional) direction. Yet, the picture is complex and fluid.177 The
question arises again to what extent methodical (different from tentative)
generalizations are possible for vast countries undergoing rapid socioeconomic transformation in an uneven fashion and whether any single
concept (such as regulatory style) may adequately reflect the emerging
patterns.
A dimension of environmental governance regimes which has
attracted virtually no scholarly attention, but which has been a salient
feature of the Chinese domestic scene, is the degree of outward orientation.
During much of the revolutionary era the ecological management system, if
any, was self-contained.178 It was intermittently and selectively opened to
outside influences but seldom other than in an ad hoc manner and on a
modest scale.179 The situation has changed materially, albeit gradually,
following the adoption of reformist strategies emphatically favoring foreign
investment and foreign trade.180
A policy of ecological
WURZEL, supra note 55 (comparing British and German environmental policy since 1972,
with specific references to case studies on water and air pollution regulation).
177. See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 95–105 (outlining changes in the environmental
policy framework over the last 30 years within the specific context of China’s participation
in a number of international environmental conferences); LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA,
supra note 167, at 290–91 (concluding that China’s environmental reforms can, over time,
lead to a more efficient economy with substantially less environmental impact with the
introduction of environmental education programs but that the current reforms will lead to
increased environmental impact throughout the 1990s and early 2000s); BENJAMIN VAN
ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA: LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND
ENFORCEMENT 45–49 (2006) (discussing the process by which China makes laws: "TopDown, From Abstract and Weak to Specific and Strict"); Carlos Wing-Hung Lo et al.,
Changes in Enforcement Styles Among Environmental Enforcement Officials in China, 41
ENV’T & P LAN. A 2706–23 (2009) (examining the ways that environmental enforcement
officials changed styles from 2000 to 2006); Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T. Carter, China’s
Environmental Governance in Transition, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (Neil
T. Carter & Arthur P. J. Mol eds., 2007) (noting that China’s environmental policy has led to
"greater decentrali[z]ation and flexibility whilst moving away from a rigid, hierarchical,
command-and-control system of environmental governance"); Joshua Su-Ya Wu, The State
of China’s Environmental Governance After the 17th Party Congress, 26 EAST ASIA 265–84
(2009) (discussing changes proposed at the 17th Party Congress and whether these changes
actually address problems with Chinese environmental governance).
178. See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 184–86 (marking 1972 as the year that China
first entered the "arena of international environmental politics," suggesting that Chinese
policy had been largely internalized before).
179. See id., at 177–219 (discussing the extent to which China allows nongovernmental influences on its environmental policy and practice).
180. See id. at 275–81 (establishing potential environmental benefits to the addition of,
among other things, foreign trade and investment to China’s economy).
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cooperation/engagement has been pursued with reasonable determination
and there has been a general willingness, where appropriate, to draw
lessons from the experience of other countries.181 This may not qualify as
the defining characteristic of the governance regime, yet it is a notable one,
an argument that may possibly be extended to all post-socialist (or better
still, previously autarkic) societies.
The implication is that the descriptive propositions regarding the
domestic institutional arrangements designed to promote environmental
protection may be overly tight and not sufficiently comprehensive. China is
witnessing structural change by embracing—selectively, in an incremental
fashion, and not uniformly—ecological modernization, indirect regulatory
instruments, flexible and transparent forms of policy implementation, and
sophisticated and progressive regulatory styles. Nevertheless, these
measures cannot be conceptualized in overly specific terms, must to be
integrated, and need to be augmented by incorporating additional factors
such as outward orientation. The notion of a domestic environmental
governance regime is viable but should be handled carefully.
The development (formation and transformation) of the Chinese
ecological management system may also provide a fertile ground for
generating new ideas with respect to the evolution of domestic
environmental governance regimes. This is the world’s most populous
country, economically resurgent yet ecologically distressed.182 More
importantly, it is an industrializing nation (rather than an industrialized
one), it has not adopted democracy/ polyarchy, it has not moved decisively
toward the rule of law (merely abandoning the rule of man in favor of a rule
by law), it is a post-socialist society without qualifying as a capitalist one,
and it has a unique institutional setup.183 This is a fundamentally different
configuration from those encountered in countries typically featured in
socio-legal studies in that field of inquiry.184
181. See generally id. at 195–213 (discussing the impact that other countries,
multinational corporations, and international organizations have had on China’s policy of
international cooperation, and mentioning specifically the United States, the United Nations,
the World Bank, General Motors, General Electric, and Dow Chemical Company, among
others).
182. See Country and Areas Ranked by Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INTERNATIONAL DATA BASE (2010), available at http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/idb/ranks.html
(finding that China’s population is 1.33 billion, over four times higher than the United States
(third largest country in the world, by population) and over 100 million people more than the
second largest country in the world, India)
183. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, Democracy, the Rule of
Law, and China’s Future, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 229, 245–51 (2005) (identifying the
significant evolution that has occurred within China’s economy).
184. See, e.g., BÖRZEL, supra note 177, at 56–58 (comparing environmental policy in
two largely socialist countries: Germany, considered an environmental leader in Europe,
and Spain, considered an "environmental laggard"); SCHREURS, supra note 55, at 241–61

32

2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 1 (2011)

Perhaps the most telling observation is that the system appears to be
predominantly exogenously driven, with endogenous factors playing a
distinctly modest role. This diminishes the lure of institutionalist
explanations that focus on the impact of regime-specific
principles/norms/rules/procedures on policy outputs (on the other hand,
institutional theories that highlight the influence of socio-organizational
settings may be of even greater relevance than elsewhere). The underlying
reason lies in the fact that the normative and structural underpinnings of the
domestic environmental governance regime are exceptionally fragile. Laws
tend to be abstract, ambiguous, impractical, incoherent, ineffective, and out
of sync with rapidly evolving socio-economic realities.185 The supporting
organizational edifice (notably, the State Environmental Protection
Administration/SEPA, the Environmental Protection Bureaus/EPBs, and the
judicial system) is heavily fragmented and seriously deprived of strategic
leverage.186
In a post-socialist milieu, force-of ideas explanations, anchored in
cognitivist rather than institutionalist models, merit closer attention than in
Western democracies.187 Central planning, coupled with direct regulation
and top-down implementation, was imported from the Soviet Union

(comparing environmental policy in the U.S., Japan, and Germany); VOGEL, supra note 174,
at 146–92 (comparing environmental policy in the U.S. with that of Great Britain); WURZEL,
supra note 55, at 4–18 (comparing German and British environmental policy styles); Jeremy
Richardson, Gunnel Gustafsson, & Grant Jordan, The Concept of Policy Style, in POLICY
STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE 1, 1–14 (Jeremy Richardson, ed., 1982) (discussing
environmental policy in a number of European countries, including Germany, Norway,
Great Britain, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands).
185. See Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at
162 (discussing the flaws in Chinese environmental law making, specifically calling it "is a
laborious process and the end product leaves much to be desired in terms of coherence");
Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 68 (characterizing Chinese
laws as "overly ambiguous, non-transparent, provisional, and sermon-like").
186. See Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at
161–64 (analyzing the organizational structure of Chinese governmental elements that play
an important role in environmental policy-making and enforcement); Mushkat,
Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 64–66 (outlining the general
responsibilities of the individual governmental agencies and their impact on the greater
organizational framework).
187. See JINGLIAN WU, supra note 161, at 57–89 (discussing the reforms that took place
following the socialist regime, beginning with the incremental reforms from 1979 to 1993
through the "Overall Advance" strategy from 1994 to the present). For background
information about the period prior to the change from socialism, see LIEBERTHAL,
GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 84–122, which summarizes the "Maoist Era"—the era
that led up to the change from Communism to socialism, and NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at
55–83, which discusses the Socialist era from 1949–1978, specifically the changes that led
to the regime change and how they affected China’s economy.
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following the Communist Revolution.188 Bottom-up mobilization of effort,
via a one-off mixture of relentless moral suasion and intense psychological
pressure, was a natural extension of revolutionary practices relied upon by a
peasant movement in its struggle with Nationalist forces during the Civil
War that erupted in 1927.189 Administrative decentralization, featuring a
transfer of power from the political center to the regional/ industrial
periphery (provinces and State-owned enterprises/SOEs) was also
influenced by foreign communist (Soviet and East European)
experience/concepts.190
By the same token, exogenously-determined, economy-wide, and ideainspired restructuring during the reform era, initially selective and slowpaced (1979–1993), and subsequently wide-ranging and fast-moving
(1994–present), has been a key factor shaping ecological initiatives.191 The
188. See LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 53–56 (discussing the
ways in which the Chinese Communist Party borrowed many of its policies and practices
from the Soviet Union); NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 59–62 (stating "China adopted the
‘command economy’ system from the Soviet Union," and setting out the system’s
fundamental characteristics).
189. See LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 43–47 (discussing the
ways in which the Chinese lifestyle and economy was forced to adapt following the 1927
Civil War); NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 43–47 (discussing the residual effects of the 1927
Civil War).
190. See NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 55–62 (describing the functions and strategy of
a command economy, which China adopted from the Soviet Union); JINGLIAN WU, supra
note 161, at 43–57 (identifying 1958 to 1978 as the period in which administrative
decentralization was integral in the transferring power from the central government to lower
level governments).
191. See JINGLINAN WU, supra note 161, at 57–90 (discussing the reforms during the
incremental period from 1979 to 1993 and the following period from 1994 to the present,
where the emphasis was placed on overall reform with a focus on "urban areas and
defin[ing] . . . a socialist commodity economy").
See generally ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 157 (giving examples and history of recent Chinese environmental
governance, the changes that have been made, and how these changes have affected the
environment); LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 273–88 (discussing the
problems existing with China’s environment originating before 1978 and the reforms that
have been put in place since then); MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157 (evaluating the ways
that China has dealt with its serious environmental problems: "a vast net-work of
environmental protection agencies[,] . . . dozens of environmental laws and . . . eight major
pollution control programs"); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153 (discussing China’s
environmental problems with respect to industrialization, urbanization, and the change from
centralized to a market-oriented economy); NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 487–504
(identifying a variety of environmental problems, ranging from air and water pollution to the
sustainability of forests and water supply); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 157
(identifying China as a crucial player in the need to address outstanding environmental
issues, specifically relating to regulation and governance); Lin Shuwen, supra note 157
(discussing the impact of market-based instruments since the 1972 Stockholm United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental
Human Rights, supra note 158 (discussing global environmental governance, with specific
examples from China’s government and economy); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental
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shift toward indirect regulation, market-based implementation, anticipatory
and consensual regulatory style, and international cooperation/engagement
is largely attributable to such macro-level, seismic changes reflecting the
jettisoning (in a stepwise fashion) of one overarching idea (a blend of
central planning and collective property rights) in favor of another (a
combination of economic decentralization/marketization and private
property rights).192
Not all development strategies are alike. Some industrializing nations
have opted for balanced expansion. By contrast, China’s reform drive has
been loosely rooted in the idea of unbalanced growth, whereby resources
are channeled more heavily toward certain segments of the economy than
others.193 The asymmetry has also manifested itself in the delicate
relationship between the economy and the ecosystem, with the former
consistently looming larger on the policy agenda than the latter. This has
materially impeded the development of the domestic environmental
governance regime during the revolutionary and reform eras, accounting for
both its inadequate nature and constrained evolution.194
An industrializing nation is, by definition, one whose modernization is
incomplete. In such a setting, traditional attitudes persist. Cognitivists may
highlight the relevance for ecological progress of the importance accorded
to social connections/guanxi (e.g., between regulator and regulatee), the
pursuit of social harmony, the determination to avoid social conflict, the
propensity toward compromise, and the preoccupation with saving face.195
Law, supra note 158 (discussing China’s implementation of new environmental regulations
in the post-Mao era).
192. See generally ECONOMY, supra note 153 (discussing the shift from a centralized to
a market-based, decentralized economy, specifically relating to the environment and ways to
improve on the new system and the environment as a whole); MA & ORTOLANO, supra note
157 (addressing the significant environmental destruction that resulted from China’s market
reforms and how the Chinese government is dealing with these problems through
regulation); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153 (analyzing specific environmental issues and
how the regulatory environment surrounding them has changed and interacted with the
introduction of market forces into the regime).
193. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Chinese
"Federalism": New Analytical Directions, 38 GLOBAL ECON. REV. 13, 14 (2009) (addressing
the "delicate balancing act" between the needs of the country and the "high degree of
concentrate[ed] resources" at the center of the government).
194. See id. at 17 (discussing the ways in which decentralization has affected the
revolutionary era and the reform era that followed, specifically that regional development
strategies have led to significant spatial disparities); see also ECONOMY, supra note 153, at
62–64 (discussing the competing interests of economic advancement and success and the
subsequent environmental effects that such economic changes have had on China’s
environment); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153, at 54–70 (discussing the effects that
overproduction and production without any consideration for environmental impact can have
on China’s environment).
195. See MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157, at 82–89 (discussing the relationship
between social norms in China and the ecological process); BARBARA J. SINKULE &
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They may also draw attention to the role played by cosmic resonance theory
and neo-Confucianism.196 The precise effect of these lingering cultural
influences is not easy to pinpoint, but it is commonly believed that they
hinder the process of institutionalization.197
Given the pervasive fragility and fragmentation of the Chinese
organizational infrastructure, in the public sector in general198 and in the

LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA 12–20 (1995)
(discussing the interaction between environmental policy implementation and social norms
in place in China); Peter Hills & C.S. Man, Environmental Regulation and the Industrial
Sector in China: The Role of Informal Relationships in Policy Implementation, 7 BUS.
STRATEGY & THE ENV’T 60–61 (1998) (identifying Chinese social concepts that influence the
environmental implementation process).
196. See Robert P. Weller & Peter K. Bol, From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature: Chinese
Concepts of the Environment and Their Influence on Policy Implementation, in ENERGIZING
CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 473, 473–83
(Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998) (describing the concepts of cosmic resonance theory
and neo-Confucianism).
197. See id. at 495–96 (offering two reasons why the two concepts are unsuccessful:
first, these views "were developed to address the dominant concerns of political culture" and
did not address environmental concerns; second, practices that emerged were used more for
personal and political gain, rather than to positively impact environmental policy); see also
MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157, at 77–93, 161–69 (analyzing the ways that social
behavior affects environmental regulatory acceptance, then comparing these social
behavioral responses to similar situations in the United States); SINKULE & ORTOLANO,
supra note 196, at 12–20, 46–50, 188–202 (discussing the social structure of Chinese
organizations, how this social structure plays into policy implementation, and three
programs that were locally designed to assist implementation); Hills & Man, supra note 196,
at 59–61 (discussing the ways that environmental policy implementation interacts with four
major Chinese social and industrial concepts: "units (danwei), systems (xitong), ‘too many
mothers in law’ (popo duo), and independent kingdoms (duli wangguo)").
198. See generally BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO
CHINA (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992) (outlining three major areas
in the Chinese public regulatory environment: national issues, the center (referring to the
governmental structure and bureacracy), and bureaucratic clusters (referring more to
individual governmental agencies and their interaction with the larger central government);
KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND CHINESE
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT (1986) [hereinafter LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS] (outlining a study done in the early 1980s to determine the inner workings of the
Chinese bureaucratic system); KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING
IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES (1988) [hereinafter LIEBERTHAL &
OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING IN CHINA] (expanding their earlier study, with the following
purpose: "to illuminate how the bureaucratic structure of the state, policy processes, and
outcomes are interrelated in contemporary China"); POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN POST-MAO
CHINA (David M. Lampton ed., 1987) (discussing and identifying the different policy types
in China: planning and economic, resource, rural sector, and education and science); David
M. Lampton, Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill, 23 ISSUES & STUD. 11 (1987)
(concluding that the Chinese political system is one of bargaining, rather than a command
system).
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environmental domain in particular,199 the models typically invoked by
institutionalists to explain ecological agenda setting and transformation
(and thus the development of governance regimes) may have gaps. Such
models fall into three general categories: pluralist, elitist, and subgovernmental.200 The first of these analytical constructs is based on
theories of American democracy formulated approximately half a century
ago.201 In this somewhat romanticized view of a polyarchical form of
political organization, power flows from the grassroots in a bottom-up
fashion.202
By contrast, proponents of the elitist, or hierarchical, theory of agenda
setting and transformation argue that power is concentrated in the hands of
the few.203 Political elites wield authority over a multitude lacking ready
access to the corridors of power.204 The authority structure resembles a

199. See generally ECONOMY, supra note 153 (discussing the Chinese political
landscape in more precise terms, dealing specifically with the environment and how it will
be affected in the future); GØRILD HEGGELUND, ENVIRONMENT AND RESETTLEMENT POLITICS
IN CHINA: THE THREE GORGES PROJECT (2004) (looking into one of the more significant
events in Chinese ecological history: The Three Gorges Dam, a controversial dam
constructed on the Yangtze River); MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157 (discussing the state of
Chinese environmental regulation); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153 (giving a historical
overview of China’s environmental problems, then discussing how politics and market
forces have shaped the state of environmental governance today); SINKULE & ORTOLANO,
supra note 196 (discussing the methods available for environmental policy implementation
in China); Kenneth Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and its Impact on Environmental
Policy Implementation, in CHINA ENVIRONMENT SERIES (1997) (discussing the challenges
facing the Chinese government with relation to environmental awareness and its interactions
with regulation and enforcement of environmental laws); Mushkat, Contextualizing
Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158 (discussing the scale of global environmental
governance, using China as its main example, and giving suggestions for how to effectively
proceed into the future); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158
(outlining the history and current state of Chinese environmental law implementation).
200. See infra notes 202–08 and accompanying text (discussing these three categories).
201. See generally DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON: A CRITICAL LOOK AT
TODAY’S STRUGGLE IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL (1964) (outlining the structure of the United
States government as it appeared in the mid-1960s); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961) (analyzing the United States
governmental system using a case study done in New Haven, Connecticut for specific
examples); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC OPINION (1951) (giving an in-depth outline of the American governmental process,
specifically how groups control the majority of aspects of this system).
202. See generally DAHL, supra note 202 (outlining city-level government by looking at
a case study in New Haven, Connecticut); TRUMAN, supra note 202 (analyzing the role of
group politics in the American governmental system).
203. See THOMAS R. DYE & L. HARMON ZIEGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN
UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (1981) ("Elites, not masses, govern
America.").
204. See generally id. (discussing the elitist model and how the elite class controls the
political system of the United States).
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pyramid, with power flowing from the top to the bottom.205 The subgovernmental model departs marginally from this pattern by converting the
rigid pyramid into an iron triangle consisting of political elites, their
bureaucratic
counterparts,
special
interests,
and
professional
advisors/experts.206 The ruling coalition is normally stable and closed to
outsiders, but more flexible formulations are available.207
Elements of those three paradigms pervade the literature on environmental
agenda setting and transformation, although the pure elitist construct is
currently seldom resorted to by researchers who explore democratic
processes (the overwhelming majority in this field).208
However, in light of the institutional atrophy and disarray witnessed in
China, it may be more appropriate to adopt the garbage can model put forth
by some organizational theorists.209 According to them, institutional
choices are often made in a chaotic fashion in a milieu akin to organized
anarchy.210 This renders policy adaptation an uncomfortably unfocused and

205. See generally id. (outlining, in detail, the American political system, with
particular emphasis on control by a small group of elites, signaling a clear top-down
structure).
206. See generally CATER, supra note 202 (analyzing who controls the U.S. government
in light of the massive expansion of the government that occurred from the beginning of the
20th century through the years following World War II); J. LEIPER FREEMAN, THE POLITICAL
PROCESS: EXECUTIVE BUREAU-LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE RELATIONS (1965) (discussing the
relationships within the U.S. government system, including between the three branches, the
political parties, and individual agencies).
207. See generally POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING: AN ADVOCACY COALITION
APPROACH (Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993) (discussing "advocacy
coalitions" in a variety of contexts, including an overall framework and a number of case
studies in North America).
208. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 55, at 22–59 (discussing the American model of
ecological agenda setting, which involves mid-level sub-governmental agencies such as the
Environmental Protection Agency that govern much of U.S. environmental policy); GOMAA,
supra note 55, at 33–34 (concluding that Egypt’s environmental agenda is dictated by a
small number of interested donor agencies, who by showing interest in contributing funds to
the government, convinced the Prime Minister to address these issues); SCHREURS, supra
note 55, at 241 (comparing Germany, whose approach to environmental protection "could be
called the green social welfare state’s approach," with the U.S., where market-based
mechanisms and cost-benefit analysis determine "when environmental protection should
take precedence," and Japan, which falls somewhere in between the two); WEALE ET AL.,
supra note 55, at 115 (concluding that the European policy process is largely pluralist in
nature, with a wide variety of sources lending input and support); WURZEL, supra note 55, at
17–18 (characterizing German and British policy styles as favoring consensus and
consultation, with German policy being slightly more rigid because it gives a more important
role to the state than Britain does).
209
. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN
ORGANIZATIONS 24–37 (1976) (outlining the basics of the "garbage can" process of
organizational theory, which exhibits persistent difficulties in resolving problems).
210. Id.
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painfully slow affair.211 There is reason to believe that Chinese decision
making on the ecological front may display such characteristics.212
A strategically loose and poorly integrated structure offers ample
scope for building autonomous power centers and, consequently, inter-party
bargaining.213 That is consistent with institutionalist propositions which
accord to negotiations a prominent role in complex organizational
processes.214 Nevertheless, China may provide only partial reinforcement
in this respect because evidence of cooperation/integrative bargaining is
relatively modest, the implication being that institutionalist models of
organizational negotiations may display an overly optimistic/positive
orientation.215
Chinese-style environmental bargaining (or regime
development) involves widespread diversion of resources, deflection of
policy goals, dilemmas of administration (stemming from resistance to
explicit efforts to control behavior administratively), and dissipation of
energies.216
Institutionalists duly acknowledge the importance of leadership in
dynamic ecological management, but place strong emphasis on organized
variants.217
The evolution of China’s amorphous and fractured
environmental governance regime may be more influenced by individuallyinspired initiatives.218 For example, during the revolutionary era and early
reform period a very small team of key players (the petroleum group) had
virtually single-handedly shaped energy strategy in the country.219 Perhaps

211. Id. at 32–37; see also JOHN W. KINGDOM, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES 84–89 (1984) (noting that the fluid structure of the garbage can model is akin to
organized anarchy).
212. See Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at
162–175 (analyzing the reasons for Chinese bureaucratic incoherence on environmental
affairs); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 66–74 (highlighting
poor observance of well-designed Chinese environmental laws).
213. See MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 210, at 82–133 (describing the function of
bargaining in decision-making among several models of choice).
214. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 81–116 (1994)
(examining institutional bargaining in an international setting).
215. See SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 196, at 27–35, 188–202 (stating that
negotiations and bargaining, which form the core of implementing Chinese environmental
policy, are not collaborative and are often affected by interagency "games").
216. See id. at 46–50, 188–202 (analyzing Chinese environmental and bureaucratic
politics).
217. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note21, at 114–15, 152–60
(finding that leadership is necessary in international negotiations but finding that
effectiveness is determined by certain variables).
218. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING IN CHINA, supra note 199, at 169–
268 (charting the elite hierarchy involved in decision-making).
219. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 198199, at
151–248 (narrating China's initial involvement in petroleum production through the lens of
the elites in the Chinese petroleum industry); LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING IN
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more tellingly, one irrepressible individual (a policy entrepreneur?), Qu
Geping—the first chief administrator of the National Environmental
Protection Bureau (NEPB) – had been at the forefront of systematic efforts
to modernize the embryonic institutional machinery erected to arrest
ecological degradation.220
Traditional-style utilitarianism is thought to be inapplicable by
institutionalists in intricate and diffuse organizational settings.221 This
narrowly-focused form of analytical reasoning however should not be
readily discarded. The Chinese environmental arena is crowded with
players (determined utility-maximizers) who vigorously pursue their own
interests to the detriment of the common good.222 This manifests itself
throughout the politico-bureaucratic pyramid, but particularly at the subnational level, where the prevailing incentive structure encourages the
formation of coalitions of local government officials and entrepreneurs
capable of stymieing progress in the ecological domain.223
B. Looking Outward
China’s participation in the development of international
environmental governance regimes has been explored selectively rather
than comprehensively. Moreover, Chinese involvement in some cases has
been marginal, in the sense of being confined to joining an existing
arrangement, as distinct from tangibly contributing to the design/redesign
and attempts to forge a broad consensus. It is nevertheless possible to
derive a number of useful insights on the basis of this limited and partly
relevant information/experience because it is not insignificant and due to
the fact that certain recurrent patterns may be observed.
One source of pertinent information is a series of events relating to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC
CHINA, supra note 199, at 169–268 (charting the rise in influence of Chinese petroleum
policy makers from the 1950s to 1980s).
220. See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 100–01 (recounting Qu Geping's efforts on the
environmental protection front).
221. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 114–15 (pointing out
the deficiencies of the utilitarian perspective).
222. See Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 87–91
(observing the competition between governmental players in Chinese environmental
regulation).
223. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and its Impact on the
Environment 1 CHINA ENVTL. SERIES 3, 3–6 (1997) (detailing the incentive structure that
leads to collaboration between local government officials and entrepreneurs in suppressing
observance of environmental regulations); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human
Rights, supra note 158, at 161–65 (observing the deficiencies in administrative enforcement
of Chinese environmental regulation due to the vast array of interested government parties);
Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 72–74, 81–85 (observing the
disconnect between Chinese environmental policy and enforcement).
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1992),224 one of numerous international environmental accords to have been
negotiated since the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment held in
Stockholm.225 The text of the Convention was the culmination of
bargaining extending over a fifteen-month period and orchestrated by the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), convened by the United
Nations General Assembly and open to participation by all interested
States.226 The Convention was made available for signature at the UN
Convention on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992 at
Rio de Janeiro, and adopted by over 150 States.227
It should be noted that, despite enjoying broad international support,
the FCCC did not elicit a binding commitment on the part of the
signatories, who merely signaled their intention to ratify the agreement in
accordance with their internal constitutional processes.228 Moreover, even
then, the treaty would not come into force as law until ratified by the
minimum number of States specified in the text (fifty).229 The Rio
Conference however took symbolic steps and established concrete
institutional mechanisms to bring about a speedy conversion into an
effective legal instrument.230
The term effective needs to be employed cautiously in this context.
"Traditionally, a treaty in international law establishes rights and
obligations among States and is designed to govern State behavior," while
"most environmental agreements, although cast in the language of State
obligation, are designed ultimately to change the behavior of private
224. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May
9th, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (committing countries to negotiate
reductions in emissions that cause climate change).
225. See generally U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973) (setting out principles that must be considered in order to
preserve the environment while promoting development).
226. See Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, The Climate Change Negotiations, in
NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION, 129, 129–31
(Irving M. Mintzer & J.A. Leonard eds., 1994) (recounting briefly the negotiating history of
the Rio Convention).
227. As of August 26, 2009, there are 193 parties to the Convention. See UNFCCC,
supra note 225, available at http:unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/
status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (listing the roster of nations that are parties to the
convention); see also Dasgupta, supra note 226, at 131–46 (reviewing the negotiations
process in an insightful manner).
228. See
UNFCCC,
supra
note
225,
at
art.
22,
available
at
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php
(binding the parties to the convention).
229. See id. art. 23 (stating that the FCCC came into force on March 21, 1994); see
also UNFCCC, supra note 225, available at http://unfccc.int/ (providing background
information).
230. See Dasgupta, supra note 227, at 129–46 (reviewing the specific obligations
created by the Convention).
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agents."231 Therefore, "the State must enact domestic legislation and
establish administrative machinery to ensure this outcome."232 Still, even if
the State proceeds to pursue that goal "in good faith, there is no assurance
that the ultimate objective—the reduction of emissions by private
individuals and firms will actually take place."233
International environmental treaties such as the FCCC also tend to be
elastic and open-ended. To be more explicit, they typically assume the
form of "a framework or umbrella convention, providing general
cooperation in the area" where behavioral adjustment is deemed
necessary.234 Such umbrella conventions anticipate "subsequent, more
specific supplementary accords (frequently called protocols) that will
establish more concrete obligations."235 Compliance may thus be a thorny
issue when these kinds of institutional patterns prevail.
Further,
236
deciphering State movements may be a challenging undertaking.
231. See Abram Chayes & Charlotte Kim, China and the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 503, 506 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998)
(examining the general contours of treaty obligations); Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler
Chayes, & Ronald B. Mitchell, Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 39, 42–43 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds.,
1998) (describing international norms as the foundation for compliance).
232. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 506 (describing the obligations placed on
countries by international treaties). See generally David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How
Compliance Happens and Doesn’t Happen Domestically, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 19, 20–23
(Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) (noting how administrative capacity
can limit effectiveness of international obligations).
233. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 506 (noting that compliance is not identical
to any responsibilities assumed). See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss &
Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) (examining ways to make decision-making more effective in
regulating the global environment); IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, & Peter Roderick eds., 1996)
(examining possible solutions to increase compliance with international agreements without
breaking fragile political consensus); Michael Faure & Jurgen Lefevere, Compliance with
International Environmental Agreements, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS,
LAW, AND POLICY 138, 138–56 (Norman J. Vig & Regina S. Axelrod eds., 1999) (discussing
the theories of compliance and methods for improving compliance for international accords).
234. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 506 (outlining the nature of international
environmental commitments).
235. See id. (discussing the nature of protocols made subsequent to international
conventions); see also Dan Bodansky, UN Convention on Climate Change, 18 YALE J. INT’L
L. 451, 493–96 (1993) (outlining the characteristics of framework conventions).
236. See Jana von Stein, The International Law and Politics of Climate Change:
Ratification of the UN Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, 52 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 243, 243–68 (2008) (arguing that while "soft" agreements like the FCCC achieve
widespread participation fairly quickly, leaders who ratify do not appear to be particularly
concerned about their ability subsequently to comply with such agreements). For a
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China approached the FCCC challenge seriously, constructively, and
actively.237 It took a close interest and participated willingly in the
elaborate scientific studies conducted from 1988 to late 1990 under the
auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).238 The
IPCC is "a broadly-based body of scientific experts designated by
governments" who will "study the science of climate change, the likely
impacts, and potential response strategies."239 In addition, Chinese
representatives were deeply involved from late 1990 to the signing of the
Convention in June 1992 in INC efforts to negotiate the FCCC.240 For the
most part, they exercised leadership and played a supportive role.241
It was not however an entirely positive experience from an
international perspective. While apparently not engaged in deliberate footdragging, China was at times distinctly slow to engineer new protocols
during the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-XI) meeting
leading up to the first Conference of Parties after the FCCC was negotiated
(resorting to vivid expressions to justify its posture: ‘the Convention is like
a big pie, and if you try to swallow the whole pie in one gulp, you will
choke’, ‘more haste, less speed’, and ‘first steps first’).242 It also
strenuously objected, whether strategically or tactically, to some key
elements of the FCCC blueprint (e.g., in-depths reviews, mechanics of the
review process, country visits, joint implementation, targets, timetables,
imposition of obligations on industrializing countries to reduce emissions,
and differentiation among industrializing countries on the basis of their
developmental status).243
Moreover, Chinese representatives consistently voiced skepticism
regarding the validity of the IPCC’s views on the subject of climate change
("[m]any scientists cast doubts on the causes of climate change. There are
so many factors affecting climate change, including the activities of the
sunspots, regulatory role of the oceans, the gigantic role of the Earth’s
discussion of the merits/demerits of the framework convention/protocol approach, see
Bodansky, supra note 236, at 451, 493–95.
237. See Dasgupta, supra note 227, at 138–39 (recounting the China’s involvement in
the Rio Convention).
238. See Baozhong Wu et al., The Status and Trend of China’s Policies on Climate
Change, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 541, 543 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998) (recalling China's involvement in
negotiating alongside the Group of 77).
239. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 507 (describing the workings of the IPCC).
240. Id. at 513–15.
241. See id. at 507 (recalling China's negotiating role in FCCC negotiations). See also
Baozhong Wu, supra note 239, at 541–54 (examining China's role in representing
developing nations alongside the Group of 77).
242. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 523 (recalling China's efforts to slow the
pace of negotiations).
243. Id. at 515–23.
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biosphere, water vapor and clouds, etc.").244 The Chinese delegation also
repeatedly emphasized that, given the residual gaps in technical knowledge,
it would be inappropriate to proceed firmly and swiftly ("governments
could not base policies decisions on such scientific uncertainties").245
The leadership exercised by China did not necessarily manifest itself
in a comprehensive fashion. It often approached crucial issues in a manner
that might be construed as partisan, in the sense of not reflecting worldwide
considerations.246 It is a moot point whether it was driven by its own
parochial interests or the belief (legitimate or otherwise) that the
international community is too heterogeneous and too unevenly structured
to allow its members to adopt a uniform strategy with respect to
environmental protection.247
Chinese representatives underlined the
persistence of substantial economic inequalities and vigorously championed
the cause of industrializing nations, perhaps implicitly relegating ecological
preservation to a position of secondary importance:
The FCCC currently negotiated should clearly recognize that it is
the developed countries which are mainly responsible for excessive
emissions of greenhouse gases, historically and currently, and it is
these developed countries which must take immediate action, with
time-bound targets, to stabilize and reduce such emissions.
Developing countries cannot be expected to accept any obligations
in the near future . . . . [D]eveloping countries must be provided
with the full scientific, technical, and financial cooperation
necessary to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change.248
Neoliberal institutionalist insights may not fully account for this pattern.
As noted earlier, the Chinese organizational façade is rather rudimentary
and seriously fragmented.249 This may explain the markedly slow policy
adaptation and frequent shifts (again, whether strategic or tactical) in the
stance regarding fundamental ecological questions.250 To reiterate a point
made previously, neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge the role played by
244. Id. at 524.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 515–23 (recounting China’s repeated demands to hold developing
countries to a different standard from developed countries).
247. See id. at 515–27 (observing China's assertion that developing countries' economic
situations entitle them to environmental regimes different from those in developed
countries).
248. See id. at 515 (recounting China's efforts separate developing countries from
developed countries in terms of duties under the FCCC).
249. See Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 87–91
(observing the discord in the Chinese environmental regime).
250. See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 515–23 (examining China's reluctance to
rapidly implement FCCC protocols).
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domestic diversity in shaping behavior in the international (including
environmental) arena, but they arguably overstate the intensity of forces
inducing actors to cooperate/engage in integrative bargaining and
understate the strength of divisive influences.251
Once more, the utilitarian perspective may be selectively invoked. 252
It has been claimed that China’s complex maneuvers in such multilateral
settings closely mirror self-interest, even when the tone is altruistic, and
that they are grounded in a set of principles derived from robust cost-benefit
logic (‘[m]aximize material capabilities above all’; ‘[a]void high cost
commitments’; ‘[i]f avoidance incurs image costs, then try to avoid high
cost commitments but join low cost, high profile activities’; ‘[i]f the
opportunities to pursue material gains unilaterally are closed off, and [the
country] has little choice but to join multilateral negotiations, then it should
try to build coalitions to weaken commitments’; ‘[i]f unilateral
opportunities to maximize relative capabilities are closed off, and coalition
building unsuccessful, then [it] should choose the least constraining
options; try to prevent the toughening of any commitments that can be
avoided’).253
Chinese advocacy of industrializing nation causes may not be
exclusively motivated by utilitarian concerns. China may genuinely see
itself, or at least did in the past, as a leader of a counter-hegemonic coalition
that is pursuing a redistributive agenda (the eradication of inequalities and
global justice primarily, and ecosystem harmony and sustainability
secondarily). To the extent that this assumption has any validity, it cannot
be readily accommodated within the framework of mainstream (utilitarian,
realist, cognitivist, and neoliberal institutionalist) international
251. See O’NEILL, THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 60,
at 32 (discussing the organizational necessity of institution-building in international
regimes); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 11–30 (examining the
theoretical workings of international regimes from an institutional perspective).
252. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 91–95 (outlining the
utilitarian perspective generally).
253. See Alastair I. Johnson, China and International Environmental Institutions: A
Decision Analysis Rule in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 555, 565–82 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998) (comparing
China’s arms control policy with its environmental policy); see also Roger Congleton,
Governing the Global Environmental Commons: The Political Economy of International
Environmental Treaties and Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: A
SURVEY OF THE ISSUES 241, 241–63 (Gunther G. Shulz & Heinrich W. Ursprung eds., 2001)
(examining the externality problem in international environmental problems); Carsten
Schmidt, Incentives for International Environmental Cooperation: Theoretical Models and
Economic Instruments, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: A SURVEY OF THE
ISSUES 209, 209–40 (Gunther G. Shulz & Heinrich W. Ursprung eds., 2001) (examining
theoretical frameworks for incentivizing compliance with international agreements and
finding that underlying assumptions are not consonant with certain realities of international
relations).
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environmental theory. To dissect such behavioral patterns, the tools of
political economy (the neo-Marxist, historical, materialist, and neoGramscian variants) may need to be employed.254
Another Chinese experience, which may be relied upon to generate
insights regarding the development of environmental governance regimes,
involves the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(hereafter referred to as the Montreal Protocol or simply the Protocol).255 It
is an instrument whose origins may be traced to the Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, a framework convention ratified by
twenty-one countries in 1985 (and ultimately, like the FCCC, to the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm,
following which several multilateral environmental agreements/MEAs have
been negotiated).256
The ozone layer, which consists of the reaches of earth’s atmosphere
between ten and fifty kilometers above the ground, furnishes protection to
myriad organisms from the harmful effects of ultra-violet radiation from the
sun.257 Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and a wide range of industrial
chemicals, commonly referred to as ozone-depleting substances (ODS),
materially diminish its protective capacities.258 In 1987, the Montreal
Protocol, which provides specific requirements and deadlines for countries
to reduce production and use of CFCs, was adopted.259 A key provision of
the Protocol requires signatory developing countries to phase out
production and use of CFCs and halons by 2010.260

254. See O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 7–20 (discussing the interplay of international
environmental agreements and international environmental politics); Paterson, supra note
60, at 55–59 (outlining the various theories of international politics).
255. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, September 16,
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
256. For a detailed account of the Montreal Protocol’s negotiations, see RICHARD
ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE P LANET
(2nd ed., 1998), which examines the Montreal Protocol negotiations from an insider's
perspective. For an effective historical overview and update through 1992, see Ian H.
Rowlands, The Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol: Report and
Reflection, 35 ENV’T 25, 25–34 (1993), which reviews chronologically the important events
in the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol.
257. See BENEDICK, supra note 257, at 9 (discussing the science of the ozone layer).
258. Id. at 10.
259. Id. at 1.
260. For a comprehensive account of the control measures and respective obligations
under the Protocol, see Ozone Secretariat, Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1, 15–18 (United Nations Environment Program,
8th ed. 2009) available at http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Handbook/ (reviewing the
Montreal Protocol's history and purpose).
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The Protocol was bolstered in 1990 when the London Amendments
established an interim Multilateral Fund (MLF or the Fund).261 The Fund,
which acquired a permanent status (and London base) in 1992, was created
to assist signatory developing countries with an annual consumption of
ODS lower than 0.3 Kg per capita (‘Article 5 countries’) in meeting their
obligations under the Protocol.262 The London Amendments, which
significantly expanded the scope of the 1987 Protocol, were signed by a
majority of developing countries (subsequent revisions have had fewer
implications for industrializing nations).263
China ratified the Montreal Protocol in 1991, after the establishment
of the MLF.264 This move coincided with calls on its part for financial
support to facilitate the discharge of its obligations so that there evidently
was a clear linkage between the willingness to commit and the availability
of assistance.265 Following ratification, the Chinese authorities promptly
took the necessary steps to meet procedural requirements by setting up
institutions to effect protocol implementation, devising a country program
for the phase-out of ODS, and reporting ODS production and consumption
data to the Ozone Secretariat.266
The actual performance has not consistently reflected the strength of
the procedural commitment. China encountered considerable difficulties in
complying with the substantive goals during the initial period after
ratification and intensified its efforts since 1996.267 Following this
adjustment, results have improved relative to targets, but the overall picture
has remained problematic.268 Chinese share of the world’s total production
261.
fund).
262.

See BENEDICK, supra note 257, at 183–88 (recalling the benefits afforded by the

About the Multilateral Fund, MULTILATERAL FUND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
MONTREAL
PROTOCOL
(2003),
available
at
http://www.multilateralfund.org/about_the_multilateral_fund.htm.
263. Id.
264. Jimin Zhao & Leonard Ortolano, The Chinese Government’s Role in Implementing
Multilateral Agreements: The Case of the Montreal Protocol, 175 CHINA Q. 708, 709–10
(2003).
265. See id. at 714–15 (recalling China's demands for instituting the fund to help
developing countries enforce the protocol).
266. See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 264, at 708–25 (2003) (narrating China's efforts
to implement the protocol); Jimin Zhao, Implementing International Environmental Treaties
in Developing Countries: China’s Compliance under the Montreal Protocol, 5 GLOBAL
ENV’L POL. 58, 58–81 (2005) [hereinafter Zhao, Implementing International Environmental
Treaties] (measuring China's compliance with the Montreal protocol); Jimin Zhao, The
Multilateral Fund and China’s Compliance with the Montreal Protocol, 11 J. ENV. & DEV.
331, 331–53 (2002) [hereinafter Zhao, The Multilateral Fund] (narrating China's efforts to
implement the protocol).
267. See Zhao, Implementing International Environmental Treaties, supra note 267, at
62 (recalling China's failure to meet its goal to reduce ozone-depleting emissions by 1996).
268. See id. at 64–66 (detailing China's success at reducing ozone-depleting emissions).
THE
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and consumption has climbed markedly because of a significant increase in
domestic demand and a corresponding decline in production and
consumption by industrialized nations, previously the principal source of
ODS.269 The ratification of the Montreal Protocol was not a straightforward
proposition for a country in the early stages of modernization. The costs
expected to be incurred by some economic sectors were not negligible, and
powerful arguments against the move were advanced by representatives of
those sectors and government officials overseeing them.270 The debate
raged over a long period and the decision could have gone either way.271
China’s scientific community (idea-driven and loosely integrated into an
international network) played a pivotal role in tipping the balance in favor
of ratification.272 This is a cognitivist-style interpretation, albeit not without
institutionalist underpinnings.
The utilitarian model however is probably the most appropriate
analytical tool for dissecting China’s response to the dilemma posed by the
Montreal Protocol. While the burden to be borne by a number of key
economic sectors could not be ignored, the costs for the country as a whole
were deemed to be relatively modest.273 There were gains to be realized, in
the form of a better image abroad and concessions secured in other areas,
by displaying a cooperative attitude.274 Ultimately, the availability of
financial support (a utilitarian-type side-payment?) proved to be the critical
factor.275
Institutional influences were by no means absent. They manifested
themselves visibly during the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and postnegotiation phases of the process. To illustrate, implementation was
substantially impacted by a host of organizational constraints (e.g., limited
administrative capacity, excessive centralization, ineffective regulatory
strategies, and inadequate enforcement).276 Be that as it may, institutional
269. Zhao, The Multilateral Fund, supra note 267, at 710 (stating that China has
become the largest producer and consumer of ozone-depleting substances).
270. See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 265, at 711–12 (narrating the debate within the
Chinese government).
271. Id.
272. See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 264, at 708, 711 (stating that the scientific
community played an outsized role in persuading the government to limit emissions); Zhao,
Implementing International Environmental Treaties, supra note 266, at 58, 71 (noting the
strength of the scientific evidence); Zhao, The Multilateral Fund, supra note 267, at 331–53
(detailing efforts by the scientific community to persuade the government).
273. See Zhao, Implementing International Environmental Treaties, supra note 267, at
73 (stating that low compliance costs were one of the reasons China accepted the protocol).
274. See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 267, at 715–16 (observing that a cooperative
image of China was a motivating factor in China's acceptance of the protocol).
275. See id. (focusing on the fund as a key reason for China's acceptance of the
protocol).
276. See Elizabeth C. Economy, The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese
Foreign Policy-Making: Broadening Perspectives and Policies . . . But Only to a Point, in
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patterns alone cannot account fully for the outcomes witnessed. Other
theoretical perspectives need to be systematically incorporated into the
conceptual framework in order to enhance its explanatory power.
IV. Conclusion
Environmental governance regimes have featured prominently in
domestic and international efforts to curtail ecological degradation. The
academic literature on the subject is broad, deep, and insightful. As might
be expected, given the socio-physical complexities confronted and the
nature of the scholarly enterprise, it is characterized by a high degree of
analytical diversity and intellectual tension.
Attempts at genuine
integration/ synthesis have been far and few between. Competing
paradigms have largely drifted their own separate ways, experiencing little
cross-fertilization.
In the Darwinian world of academic ideas, some perspectives fare
better than others. Realism has been found to have merely marginal
relevance as a theoretical tool for shedding light on the development of
environmental governance regimes. Utilitarianism and cognitivism have
exerted greater influence but have lost some of their original luster.
Neoliberal institutionalism, on the other hand, has gained momentum and
its proponents have been the dominant force shaping the understanding of
the dynamics of ecological management system formation and
transformation.
Neoliberal institutionalism is firmly rooted in Western democratic soil,
although its claims of universal validity are not unjustified. It has not really
been extensively and properly tested in inherently less hospitable territory.
Many Chinese environmental experiences may be comfortably
accommodated within a neoliberal institutional framework.277
As
THE MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN AN ERA OF REFORM 230, 241–49
(David M. Lampton ed., 2001) (documenting the reticence within the Chinese government
over adopting and adhering to the Montreal Protocol); Zhang Kunmin & Wang Can, China’s
Sustainable Development Strategy and International Cooperation on the Environment, in
IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN GERMANY AND CHINA 1, 1–19
(Zhenghua Tao and Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2001) (detailing China's solutions to the
environmental problems it faces); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights,
supra note 158, at 162–175 (discussing the factors that hinder Chinese ecological
governance); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 66–74
(detailing the factors weighing down Chinese environmental regulatory enforcement).
277. See generally GERALD CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: TRADE,
ARMS CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) (measuring China's
international involvement by its compliance with international accords); HEGGELUND, supra
note 90 (examining Chinese efforts to build the Three Gorges Dam through an
environmental lens); ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE:
CHINA, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY 144–80 (2007); Gerald Chan, China’s Compliance
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demonstrated in this paper, there is however ample evidence to suggest that
the challenges of explaining regime development is simply too
overwhelming to be addressed from a single conceptual viewpoint. It may
be desirable to go back to the drawing board and renew the search for
multi-dimensional research strategies.278
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278. See Olav Schram Stokke, Understanding the Formation of International
Environmental Regimes, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
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